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Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and 
corporate control.  In this Article, Professors Kahan and Rock document and 
examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activ-
ism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate 
governance and regulatory reform.  The authors argue that hedge fund activ-
ism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways:  it is di-
rected at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, sys-
temic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather 
than incidental and ex post).  The reasons for these differences may lie in the 
incentive structures of hedge fund managers as well as in the fact that tradi-
tional institutions face regulatory barriers, political constraints, or conflicts of 
interest that make activism less profitable than it is for hedge funds.  But the 
differences may also be due to the fact that traditional institutions pursue a di-
versification strategy that is difficult to combine with strategic activism. 
Although hedge funds hold great promise as active shareholders, their in-
tense involvement in corporate governance and control raises two potential 
problems:  the interests of hedge funds sometimes diverge from those of their fel-
low shareholders, and the intensity of hedge fund activism imposes substantial 
stress that the regulatory system may not be able to withstand.  The resulting 
concerns, however, are relatively isolated and narrow, do not undermine the 
value of hedge fund activism as a whole, and do not warrant major additional 
regulatory interventions. 
The sharpest accusation leveled against activist funds is that activism is 
designed to achieve a short-term payoff at the expense of long-term profitability.  
Although the authors consider this a potentially serious problem that arguably 
pervades hedge fund activism, they conclude that a sufficient case for legal in-
tervention has not been made.  This conclusion results from the uncertainties 
about whether short-termism is, in fact, a real problem and how much hedge 
fund activism is driven by excessive short-termism.  But most importantly, it 
stems from the authors’ view that market forces and adaptive devices adopted by 
companies individually are better designed than regulation to deal with the po-
tential negative effects of hedge fund short-termism, while preserving the positive 
effects of hedge-fund activism. 
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Yuen for their helpful research assistance. 
  
2007] HEDGE FUNDS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1023 
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................1024 
I.    WHAT’S GOING ON OUT THERE?   
  SOME ILLUSTRATIVE, HAPPY STORIES ...........................................1028 
A.  Hedge Funds as Activists ..........................................................1029 
1.  Corporate Governance Activism...........................................1029 
2.  Corporate Control Activism..................................................1034 
a.  Blocking Acquirers............................................................1034 
b.  Blocking Targets ..............................................................1037 
c.  Making Bids ...................................................................1040 
B.  Activism by Traditional Institutions Compared............................1042 
C.  Hedge Fund Activism in Perspective ...........................................1046 
II.   HEDGE FUNDS AS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS...............................1047 
A.  Mutual Funds and Monitoring .................................................1048 
1.  The Pluses:  Size and Expertise ............................................1048 
2.  The Minuses:  Regulation, Incentive  
Problems, and Conflicts ........................................................1048 
a.  Regulatory Constraints......................................................1049 
b.  Incentives To Monitor ......................................................1050 
c.  Conflicts of Interest ...........................................................1054 
d.  Concluding Remarks ........................................................1056 
B.  Public Pension Funds and Monitoring .......................................1057 
C.  Hedge Funds and Monitoring ...................................................1062 
1.  Size.........................................................................................1062 
2.  Regulatory Constraints..........................................................1062 
3.  Incentives to Monitor............................................................1064 
4.  Conflicts of Interest...............................................................1066 
5.  Activism and Stakes ...............................................................1069 
III.   PROBLEMS GENERATED BY HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM:    
  CONFLICTS AND STRESS FRACTURES..............................................1070 
A.  The Dark Side:  Hedging-Related Conflicts ..................................1072 
1.  Buying (Control) vs. Selling (Shares) ..................................1072 
2.  Conflicts in Merger Votes .....................................................1073 
3.  Empty Voting.........................................................................1075 
B.  Stress Fractures........................................................................1077 
1.  Undisclosed Concerted Action.............................................1077 
2.  Overvoting .............................................................................1079 
C.  The Absence (So Far) of a Third Conflict:    
Paying Hedge Funds Off..........................................................1082 
IV.  PERVASIVE SHORT-TERMISM?.........................................................1083 
A.  A Real Problem? ......................................................................1083 
B.  Potential Responses? ................................................................1087 
CONCLUSION........................................................................................1091 
 
  
1024 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 1021 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Hedge funds1 have become critical players in both corporate gov-
ernance and corporate control.  Recently, hedge funds have pressured 
McDonald’s to spin off major assets in an IPO;2 asked Time Warner to 
change its business strategy;3 threatened or commenced proxy con-
tests at H.J. Heinz,4 Massey Energy,5 KT&G,6 infoUSA,7 Sitel,8 and 
1 For purposes of this Article, and in general, hedge funds are funds exempt from 
regulation under the Investment Company Act that invest primarily in publicly traded 
securities or financial derivatives.  See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS:  STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 3 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
hedgefunds0903.pdf (defining the term “hedge fund”). 
2 See Jesse Eisinger, Hedge-Fund Man at McDonald’s, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at 
C1 (noting pressure by Pershing Square, a hedge fund, on McDonald’s to sell com-
pany-owned restaurants); Steven Gray, Big Shareholder of McDonald’s Urges Asset IPO, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2005, at A6 (reporting Pershing Square’s response to McDonald’s 
rejection of its proposal). 
3 See Julia Angwin, Icahn Confirms Time Warner Challenge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2005, 
at A3 (detailing Carl Icahn’s alliance with three other investors to “agitate for changes” 
at Time Warner); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Richard Siklos, Icahn Tries To Form a Team to 
Take On Time Warner, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at C1 (describing a plan by Icahn to 
“form a faction with enough leverage to spin off Time Warner Cable, and possibly 
other divisions”). 
4 See Janet Adamy & David Reilly, Heinz Says Investor’s Company Plans To Nominate 5 
Directors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at B2 (reporting that Trian Partners had nominated 
five directors to run for the board of H.J. Heinz Co.). 
5 See Investment Company Wants Representation on Massey Board, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Mar. 17, 2006, available at Factiva, Doc. No. APRS000020060317e23h002ea (noting 
Third Point LLC’s plan to nominate two candidates for Massey’s board to “present 
stockholders’ perspectives on management direction,” executive compensation, and 
other issues). 
6 See Seon-Jin Cha, Icahn Group Demands Access to KT&G Books, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 
2006, at C4 (reporting and analyzing the proxy contest between a group of investors 
led by Carl Icahn and KT&G management); Laura Santini, Icahn Group Lands KT&G 
Board Seat, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2006, at C4 (describing the Icahn group as having 
“won more support than expected” during the proxy contest). 
7 See InfoUSA Tells Shareholders To Ignore Hedge Fund, REUTERS, May 4, 2006, available 
at Factiva, Doc. No. LBA0000020060504e254001vp (discussing the proxy contest be-
tween infoUSA’s founder and Dolphin, a Connecticut-based hedge fund). 
8 See JANA Partners LLC Announces SITEL Board Nominees and Intention To Replace 
Additional Board Members, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 23, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
PRN0000020051123e1bn0050s (noting Jana Partners’ nomination of three director 
candidates for SITEL’s board). 
  
2007] HEDGE FUNDS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1025 
 
GenCorp;9 made a bid to acquire Houston Exploration;10 pushed for a 
merger between Euronext and Deutsche Börse;11 pushed for “changes 
in management and strategy” at Nabi Biopharmaceuticals;12 opposed 
acquisitions by Novartis of the remaining 58% stake in Chiron,13 by 
Sears Holdings of the 46% minority interest in Sears Canada,14 by Mi-
cron of Lexar Media,15 and by a group of private equity firms of 
VNU;16 threatened litigation against Delphi;17 and pushed for litiga-
tion against Calpine that led to the ouster of its top two executives.18
9 See Clint Swett, Shareholder Revolt Rocks GenCorp, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 1, 2006, 
at A1 (reporting Pirate Capital’s victory in a proxy battle to elect its slate of directors to 
GenCorp’s board). 
10 See Marietta Cauchi, Jana Partners Sets Energy Bid in Unusual Move for Hedge Fund, 
WALL ST. J., June 13, 2006, at A18 (reporting the bid by Jana for Houston Explora-
tion). 
11 See Nick Clark & Vivek Ahuja, Hedge Fund Forces Euronext Merger Vote, FIN. NEWS ONLINE 
US, Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.financialnews-us.com/?page=ushome&contentid=531748 
(discussing Euronext’s acquiescence to The Children’s Investment Fund’s request for 
a vote); Posting to Hedge Fund Street, Hedge Funds Push for Merger of Deutsche 
Boerse & Euronext, http://www.fundstreet.org/2005/11/index.html (Nov. 23, 2005) 
(noting the proposed merger and providing the historical context). 
12 Robert Steyer, Hedge Funds Take Aim at Nabi, THESTREET.COM, Apr. 26, 2006, 
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/biotech/10281755.html. 
13 See David P. Hamilton, Shareholder Insurrection Infects Novartis’s $5.1 Billion Chiron 
Bid, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2006, at C3 (detailing the challenges ValueAct’s activism pre-
sented to the then-proposed merger between Novartis and Chiron); ValueAct Capital 
Refuses To Meet with Chiron Directors Except To Discuss Ways To Increase Shareholder Value 
Beyond $45, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 15, 2006, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
BWR0000020060315e23f0041v (noting ValueAct’s continued opposition to the 
merger). 
14 See Gary Norris, Sears Holdings Says It Will Own 100% of Sears Canada Despite Hedge 
Fund, CBC.CA, Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/cp/business/060407/b040783.html 
(detailing Sears Holdings’ attempt to take Sears Canada private and Pershing Square’s 
opposition to the transaction). 
15 See Jeff Chappell, Hedge Fund Investors Question Lexar-Micron Deal, ELECTRONIC 
NEWS, Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.edn.com/article/CA6323076.html?partner=enews 
(reporting the concerns of a consortium of hedge funds, including Icahn Associates 
Corporation and Elliott Associates, L.P., that the merger paid an insufficient price for 
Lexar). 
16 See Jason Singer, Knight Presses VNU Overhaul Plan, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2006, at 
C4 (describing Knight Vinke Asset Management’s opposition to the transaction). 
17 See Jeffrey McCracken, Delphi Ripped for Bankruptcy Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 
2006, at A10 (discussing an attempt by David Tepper, the head of Appaloosa Manage-
ment, to form an equity committee in the Delphi bankruptcy case). 
18 Rebecca Smith & Henry Sender, Executives’ Ouster Shows Growing Hedge-Fund 
Clout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at A1 (detailing the battle between Calpine’s manage-
ment and dozens of hedge funds over bankruptcy strategy). 
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Even though most hedge funds are not activist,19 the ones that are 
have captured attention.  Martin Lipton, the renowned advisor to 
corporate boards and veteran of the takeover wars of the 1980s, lists 
“attacks by activist hedge funds” as the number one key issue for direc-
tors.20  The Wall Street Journal, the newspaper of record for executives, 
bankers, and investment professionals, calls hedge funds the “new 
leader” on the “list of bogeymen haunting the corporate board-
room.”21  The Economist has run a special report on shareholder de-
mocracy focusing on activism by hedge funds,22  and several European 
governments are considering regulations designed to curb hedge 
fund activism.23
What should we make of this spate of shareholder activism by 
hedge funds?  Are hedge funds the “Holy Grail” of corporate govern-
ance—the long sought-after shareholder champion with the incen-
tives and expertise to protect shareholder interests in publicly held 
firms?  Or do they represent darker forces, in search of quick profit 
opportunities at the expense of other shareholders and the long-term 
health of the economy? 
In this Article, we analyze and evaluate the implications of the rise 
of hedge funds for corporate governance and corporate control.  In 
Part I, we examine and categorize a variety of presumptively “happy 
stories”—that is, examples of different kinds of activism where hedge 
19 See infra Part I.C. 
20 Client Memorandum from Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Key 
Issues for Directors (Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Key Issues for Directors] (on file with 
authors); see also Client Memorandum from Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz, Attacks by Activist Hedge Funds (Mar. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Attacks by Activist 
Hedge Funds] (on file with authors) (presenting a checklist for clients to avoid disrup-
tions caused activist hedge funds); Client Memorandum from Martin Lipton et al., 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Be Prepared for Attacks by Hedge Funds (Dec. 21, 
2005) [hereinafter Be Prepared for Attacks by Hedge Funds] (on file with authors) 
(noting an “environment of attacks by hedge funds” and advising companies on how to 
deal with it). 
21 Alan Murray, Hedge Funds Are New Sheriffs of Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 
2005, at A2; see also Jesse Eisinger, Memo to Activists:  Mind CEO Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 
2006, at C1 (“The shareholder activists with the most clout these days are hedge-fund 
managers . . . .”). 
22 Battling for Corporate America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 69, 69-71. 
23 See Edward Taylor, German Official Wants To Put Hedge Funds on G-8’s Agenda, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at C4 (reporting that the German finance minister wanted 
to discuss the transparency of hedge funds, a concern shared by managers worried 
about activist funds); Edward Taylor & Alistair MacDonald, Hedge Funds Face Europe’s 
Clippers, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2006, at C1 (describing regulations being considered by 
Germany and the Netherlands). 
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funds have no apparent conflict of interest.  We argue that this hedge 
fund activism differs, quantitatively and qualitatively, from the more 
moderate forms of activism that traditional institutional investors en-
gage in. 
In Part II, we analyze why hedge funds are so much more active 
than other institutional investors.  We show that hedge funds have 
better incentives, are subject to fewer regulatory impediments, and 
face fewer conflicts of interest than traditional institutions, such as 
mutual funds and pension funds, which have never lived up to the 
hopes of their partisans.  But the activism of hedge funds may also be 
due to the fact that many follow a different business strategy than tra-
ditional institutions.  This strategy involves taking high stakes in port-
folio companies in order to become activist, rather than diversifying 
and becoming involved (if at all) only ex post when companies are 
underperforming, thus blurring the lines between betting on and de-
termining the outcome of contests. 
In Part III, we turn to potential problems generated by hedge 
fund activism.  We first examine the “dark side” of activism—instances 
where the interests of activist hedge funds conflict with those of their 
fellow shareholders—to see whether regulatory intervention is war-
ranted.  We then discuss other problems that arise from the stress that 
hedge funds put on the governance system. 
In Part IV, we turn to the most severe attack leveled against hedge 
funds:  that hedge fund activism increases the pressure for short-term 
results over more valuable long-term benefits.  We accept that short-
termism by hedge funds can aggravate short-termism in the executive 
suite.  But we nevertheless conclude that, at this point, no regulatory 
intervention is warranted because:  it is unclear to what extent hedge 
fund activism is driven by excessive short-termism; hedge funds usually 
need the support of other, less short-term oriented constituents to af-
fect corporate policy; and, to the extent short-termism generates a 
problem, adaptive devices adopted by corporations are a better way to 
address it than regulation.24
24 We do not address the question of whether additional regulation is needed to 
protect hedge fund investors from either investment risk or unscrupulous managers.  
While important and timely, this question is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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I.  WHAT’S GOING ON OUT THERE?  SOME  
ILLUSTRATIVE, HAPPY STORIES 
Hedge funds are emerging as the most dynamic and most promi-
nent shareholder activists.  On the bright side, this generates the pos-
sibility that hedge funds will, in the course of making profits for their 
own investors, help overcome the classic agency problem of publicly 
held corporations by dislodging underperforming managers, chal-
lenging ineffective strategies, and making sure that merger and con-
trol transactions make sense for shareholders.  In so doing, if one 
looks at the bright side, hedge funds would enhance the value of the 
companies in which they invest for the benefit of both their own in-
vestors and their fellow shareholders.  In the first Section of this Part, 
we examine and categorize the different ways in which hedge funds, 
without any apparent conflicts of interest, have confronted managers.  
This Section illustrates the potential bright side of hedge fund activ-
ism. 
But the bright-side story of hedge funds—of large and sophisti-
cated investors standing up to management for the benefit of share-
holders at large—has an element of déjà vu.  Twenty years ago, similar 
stories were told about another set of large and sophisticated inves-
tors:  mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies—or “in-
stitutional investors,” as they became known.25  While, on the whole, 
the rise of these traditional institutional investors has probably been 
beneficial, they have hardly proven to be a silver bullet. 
Are there reasons to think that the newly prominent hedge funds 
will be more effective?  In Section B of this Part, we start answering 
this question by comparing the activism of hedge funds to the activism 
of traditional institutions.  We show that hedge fund activism differs in 
degree and type from activism by traditional institutions. 
In the final Section of this Part, we place hedge fund activism in 
the context of hedge fund investment strategies more generally.  Be-
cause only a small portion of hedge fund assets are devoted to share-
holder activism, activism does not dominate what hedge funds do.  
25 See generally Anat R. Admati et al., Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Fi-
nancial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1097 (1994); Bernard S. Black, Agents 
Watching Agents:  The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); 
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Ronald 
J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:  An Agenda for Institutional 
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Signifi-
cance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); Mark J. Roe, A Political 
Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991). 
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Hedge funds, however, dominate certain modes of activism and—if 
that activism is profitable and more hedge funds’ assets become de-
voted to it—the extent of hedge fund activism could quickly increase. 
A.  Hedge Funds as Activists 
1.  Corporate Governance Activism 
Hedge funds have increasingly tried to influence the business 
strategy and management of corporations.  This activism takes a vari-
ety of forms, from public pressure on a portfolio company to change 
its business strategy, to the running of a proxy contest to gain seats on 
the board of directors, to litigation against present or former manag-
ers. 
One of the better known (and more entertaining) activist hedge 
funds is Third Point, which has about $4 billion under management.26  
Its list of recent targets includes Ligand, Salton, Western Gas Re-
sources, Massey Energy, Potlatch, Intercept, Warnaco, Penn Virginia, 
and Star Gas Partners.27  Star Gas, to pick one of the targets, is a heat-
ing oil distributor in which Third Point acquired a 6% stake.28  In ad-
dition to severely criticizing then-CEO Irik Sevin’s management of the 
company, Third Point attacked him personally:  “It is time for you to 
step down from your role as CEO and director so that you can do what 
you do best:  retreat to your waterfront mansion in the Hamptons 
where you can play tennis and hobnob with your fellow socialites.”29  
The governance practices of Star Gas were apparently not ideal.  
Third Point openly wondered: 
[H]ow is it possible that you selected your elderly 78-year-old mom to 
serve on the Company’s Board of Directors and as a full-time employee 
providing employee and unitholder services?  We further wonder under 
what theory of corporate governance does one’s mom sit on a Company 
board.  Should you be found derelict in the performance of your execu-
26 James Kelly Joins Third Point as President and Chief Operating Officer, PR NEWSWIRE, 
Sept. 7, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. PRN0000020050907e197003s1. 
27 Innisfree M&A Inc., Presentation to Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
LLP, at slide 15 (Apr. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Innisfree Presentation] (on file with au-
thors). 
28 Third Point Demands that Star Gas CEO, Irik Sevin, Resigns and Returns Keys to  
Company Car, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
PRN0000020050214e12e00dqm. 
29 Id. 
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tive duties, as we believe is the case, we do not believe your mom is the 
right person to fire you from your job.
30
The tactic worked.  Bowing to the pressure generated by Third Point, 
Sevin resigned one month later.31
The exploits of Barington Capital Group provide another good 
example.  In June 2003, a syndicate of investors led by Barington 
nominated three directors to the board of Nautica Enterprises, the 
sportswear company.  At the time, it held about 3.1% of Nautica 
stock.32  Shortly thereafter, the company indicated that it was discuss-
ing a possible sale.33  Barington subsequently convinced Institutional 
Shareholder Services, a proxy voting advisory service, to recommend 
that its clients vote for two director candidates nominated by Baring-
ton.34  By July 2003, Barington’s tactics had worked:  Nautica agreed to 
be acquired by VF Corporation for $587 million,35 and Barington 
dropped its proxy fight.36  The following July, Barington turned to Ste-
ven Madden, the shoe retailer, and urged it to explore “strategic dis-
cussions with potential acquirers.”37  Barington, which had accumu-
lated a 7.7% stake, sent outside directors a strongly worded letter 
demanding that Steven Madden hire a more seasoned CEO, reduce 
change in control compensation, reduce conflicts of interest on the 
board, and use its excess cash to buy back shares and pay dividends.38  
30 Id. 
31 Ron Orol, Fortress GenCorp, THEDEAL.COM, Mar. 24, 2005, http:// 
www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/TDDArticle/ 
TDStandardArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=1111624424652.  Whether this was 
too little too late is an interesting but separate question.  After a brief uptick, Star Gas’s 
stock price continued to decline. 
32 Suzanne Kapner, Board Move Lifts Nautica 21 Percent, N.Y. POST, June 12, 2003, at 
41. 
33 Suzanne Kapner, Nautica Rises 11% on News of Suitor, N.Y. POST, June 21, 2003, 
at 20. 
34 Institutional Shareholder Services Recommends Election of Barington Companies 
Group Nominees, PR NEWSWIRE, July 2, 2003, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
PRN0000020030702dz72000k6.  
35 Greeta Sundaramoorthy, Nautica Accepts $587m VF Bid, FIN. TIMES (London), 
July 8, 2003, at 26. 
36 Barington Companies Group Reacts Favorably to Proposed Acquisition of Nautica Enter-
prises by VF Corporation—Withdraws Proxy Solicitation, PR NEWSWIRE, July 7, 2003, available 
at Factiva, Doc. No. PRN0000020030707dz770011s. 
37 Tania Padgett, A Proxy Fight Is Brewing for Steven Madden, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Dec. 
30, 2004, at A45. 
38 Barington Capital Group Sends Letter to Outside Directors of Steven Madden Ltd. Calls 
for the Board To Replace CEO Jamieson Karson and To Make Other Changes To Enhance Share-
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By February 2005, the Steve Madden board agreed to spend $25 mil-
lion in 2005 for share repurchases and dividends and to meet with 
representatives of Barington on a regular basis in order to avoid a 
proxy fight.39
Carl Icahn, familiar to some from the takeover battles of the 
1980s, has returned to the headlines by starting a hedge fund, buying 
blocks in companies and pressuring them to change.40  For example, 
he teamed up with Jana Partners to take a position in Kerr-McGee and 
push for change.41  The outcome was a restructuring in which Kerr-
McGee sold off its chemicals unit and its North Sea oil fields.42  Icahn 
has more recently put pressure on Blockbuster, where he gained a 
board seat;43 Time Warner, where the company agreed to add some 
independent directors to its board and to increase the size of its share 
repurchase program;44 KT&G, where the group he led gained board 
representation;45 and Motorola, where he is seeking board representa-
tion.46
Other examples, many involving household names, abound. Tar-
gets of corporate governance activism include McDonald’s, where Per-
shing Square has sought a spin-off of its real estate assets;47 Wendy’s, 
where Trian Partners has provoked an asset spin-off and gained board 
holder Value, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 13, 2004, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
PRN0000020041213e0cd00d4a. 
39 Steven Madden, Ltd. and the Barington Capital Group Reach Agreement—Company 
Will Allocate $25 Million to Share Repurchase and/or Dividends in 2005, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 
2, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. PRN0000020050202e12200bvv. 
40 Susan Pulliam & Martin Peers, Once a Lone Wolf, Carl Icahn Goes Hedge-Fund 
Route, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A1. 
41 News in Brief:  Americas:  Moody’s Warns Kerr-McGee, THEDEAL.COM, Mar. 4, 2005, 
http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/TDDArticle/ 
TDStandardArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=1107993117669 (noting pressure 
from Icahn and Jana Partners, who both sought seats on the Kerr-McGee board). 
42 Patricia Koza, Kerr Pursues Revamp, THEDEAL.COM, Aug. 8, 2005, 
http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/TDDArticle/ 
TDStandardArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=1123524351195. 
43 Henny Sender, Hedge Funds:  The New Corporate Activist, WALL ST. J., May 13, 
2005, at C1. 
44 Matthew Karnitschnig, Time Warner, Icahn Reach Accord, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18-19, 
2006, at A3. 
45 Santini, supra note 6. 
46 Li Yuan & Christopher Rhoads, Icahn Bid Adds to Woes Dogging Motorola’s CEO, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2007, at A1. 
47 Eisinger, supra note 2. 
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strategy.  Take, for example, Cardinal Value Equity Partners, which  
seats;48 Heinz, where Trian has nominated five directors to the twelve-
member board;49 Pep Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, where Barington has 
sought to induce the company “to sell itself or replace its CEO”;50 and 
Delphi Corp., where Appaloosa Management has sought board seats 
and the creation of (and representation on) an official equity com-
mittee to represent shareholder interests in the company’s Chapter 11 
proceeding.51
In the course of their general corporate governance activities, 
hedge funds often get involved in various legal disputes with the tar-
gets of their activism.  While these disputes are usually an adjunct to 
broader activism—as when Jana Partners sued SourceCorp to invali-
date changes in the company’s bylaws in light of an impending proxy 
contest,52 or when Mason Capital tried to block the recapitalization of 
Kaman, arguing that it violated the Connecticut antitakeover 
statute53—litigation is sometimes an essential part of the activist 
48 James Politi, Wendy’s Agrees Deal with Trian, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 3, 2006, 
at 15. 
49 Janet Adamy, Heinz Investors To Seek Board Seats, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2006, at 
A17. 
50 Suzanne McGee, US Shareholder Friendly Rankings, DAILYII, Apr. 14, 2006, http:// 
www.dailyii.com/article.asp?ArticleID=1025799. 
51 McCracken, supra note 17; see also Karen Richardson, New Way To Play Distressed 
Firms:  Acquire the Stock, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2006, at C1 (reporting that Xerion Capital 
helped form a shareholder committee, which succeeded in increasing the sale price of 
Riverstone Networks’ assets in Chapter 11 from $170 to $210 million).  For other in-
stances of hedge fund governance activism, see Joseph T. Hallinan & Dennis K. Ber-
man, Knight Ridder Goes up for Sale, but a Bidding War Is Unlikely, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 
2005, at A3 (noting that under pressure from hedge fund Private Capital Management 
and the company’s largest shareholder, Knight Ridder put itself up for sale); Alan 
Murray, Backlash Against CEOs Could Go Too Far, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2005, at A2 (ob-
serving that hedge funds ratcheted up pressure on the Morgan Stanley board to re-
move its CEO); Sender, supra note 43 (discussing hedge fund activism at OfficeMax, 
Woolworths, and Wendy’s); Steel Partners Asks Board of BKF Capital Group To Redeem Poi-
son Pill, Use Excess Cash To Up Dividend and Buy Back Stock, Add Representatives of Institu-
tional Stockholders to Board Steel Partners Says Board Needs To Improve Operating Profits and 
Reduce Expenses, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 16, 2004, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
PRN0000020041216e0cg00ahw (discussing efforts by Steel Partners to influence the 
board of BKF capital group); Steel Partners Serves Notice to BKF Capital Group, Inc. That It 
Intends To Nominate Three Individuals for Election to BKF’s Board at BKF’s 2005 Annual 
Meeting of Stockholders, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
PRN0000020050214e12e00e79 (revealing Steel Partners’ plans to nominate director 
candidates for BFK’s board). 
52 Jana Partners Sues SourceCorp, DALLAS BUS. J. (online edition), July 6, 2005, 
http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2005/07/04/daily20.html. 
53 Mason Capital, Ltd. v. Kaman Corp., No. 3:05CV1470, 2005 WL 2850083, at *1 
(D. Conn. Oct. 31, 2005); see also Judge Rules in Favor of Kaman’s Proposed Recapitalization; 
Enjoins Closing Until December 1, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 31, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. 
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Take, for example, Cardinal Value Equity Partners, which owned 
about 1.5 million shares in Hollinger International.  When allegations 
of self-dealing and other improper transactions by Conrad Black, 
Hollinger’s CEO, and other members of Hollinger’s management sur-
faced, Cardinal brought a lawsuit in Delaware to obtain records and 
corporate documents.54  Six months later, in December 2003, Cardi-
nal brought a derivative lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty against 
Hollinger’s board of directors.55  Cardinal subsequently agreed to stay 
the action until an internal investigation of the alleged misconduct 
was finished.56  By May 2005, Cardinal had negotiated a $50 million 
settlement with the directors not directly implicated in the self-
dealing, with Hollinger continuing to pursue the self-dealing claims 
against Black and some of his associates in a separate litigation.57  Car-
dinal, moreover, has continued to pressure Hollinger’s board and re-
cently criticized its failure to remove some of the settling directors 
from its ranks.58
Tellingly, hedge funds have even sought appointment as lead 
plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act.59  What makes these efforts noteworthy is that, 
even though hedge funds are often among the investors with the larg-
est losses, their appointment as lead plaintiffs is fraught with prob-
lems.  Because hedge funds often engage in short selling, they face is-
sues of reliance that may render them “inadequate” class 
representatives.  A short strategy is based on the assumption that the 
No. PRN0000020051031e1av004v9 (reporting the ruling in favor of Kaman); Kaman 
and Mason Agree To End Litigation Concerning Recapitalization, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 
2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. PRN0000020051103e1b3004pv (announcing an 
agreement between the two firms to end the suit). 
54 Liz Vaughan-Adams, Hollinger Investor Seeks Access to Internal Records, INDEPEND-
ENT (London), July 9, 2003, at 19. 
55 Jim Kirk, Hollinger Board Never Said No, Suit Alleges, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 2004, at 1. 
56 Dominic Rushe & John O’Donnell, Lord Black ‘Looted $300m’, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Jan. 4, 2004, § 3, at 1. 
57 Press Release, Hollinger Int’l, Hollinger International Inc. Announces Settle-
ment by Certain of Its Current and Former Independent Directors of Claims Asserted 
in Derivative Action Filed by Cardinal Value Equity Partners, L.P. (May 3, 2005) (on 
file with authors). 
58 Richard Siklos, Rebuked, Even Sued, a Board Remains in Place, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 
2005, at C1.  For examples of other instances where Cardinal engaged in litigation, see 
In re Pure Resources Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 19876, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 9, 2002); Associated Press, Cardinal Value Sues InfoUSA CEO, HIGHBEAM RES., 
Feb. 24, 2006, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-118948139.html. 
59 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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current market price is inaccurate.  This provides evidence that a 
short-selling hedge fund did not rely on the integrity of the market 
price, as required under the fraud on the market theory on which 
most securities fraud class actions are based.  Indeed, as a result of this 
conflict, courts have often, though not uniformly,60 rejected the ap-
pointment of hedge funds as lead plaintiffs.61
2.  Corporate Control Activism 
Hedge funds have been particularly active in transactions involv-
ing potential changes in corporate control.  This activism broadly falls 
into three categories.  First, as shareholders of the potential acquirer, 
hedge funds have tried to prevent the consummation of the transac-
tion. Second, as shareholders of the potential target, hedge funds 
have tried to block the deal or improve the terms for target share-
holders.  Third, hedge funds have themselves—sometimes on their 
own, sometimes as part of a group—tried to acquire companies. 
a.  Blocking Acquirers
Perhaps the best-known example of a hedge fund blocking an ac-
quirer involves the proposed acquisition by Deutsche Börse (DB) of 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  Having tried and failed to ac-
60 See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 01-425-SLR, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 17904, at *10-20 (D. Del. Oct. 6, 2003) (certifying the class in a securities fraud 
suit and rejecting challenges to a hedge fund as a representative—challenges based on 
the alleged unsuitability of hedge funds to serve in that role); Danis v. USN Commc’ns, 
Inc., 189 F.R.D. 391, 396 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (rejecting a challenge to a hedge fund’s typi-
cality based on short sales, because the fund also sustained losses on long positions). 
61 See, e.g., Camden Asset Mgmt., L.P. v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 99-8275-CIV-
MIDDLEBROOKS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11022, at *54-56 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2001) (de-
nying class certification in a class action brought by a fund that hedged its investment 
in convertible debentures, because individual issues of reliance were held to predomi-
nate); In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109-10 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (holding that a hedge fund, which had shorted stock, was an inadequate class 
representative in a fraud on the market class action because short strategy is premised 
on inaccuracy of current market price); In re Bank One S’holders Class Actions, 96 F. 
Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (rejecting a hedge fund as a lead plaintiff that had 
“engaged in extensive daytrading, first shorting Bank One stock (presumably because 
it was regarded as overvalued at market price) and then buying to cover the short posi-
tion”).  In an interesting development, Chancellor Leo Strine forced a hedge fund to 
serve as a defendant class representative in Regal Entertainment Group v. Amaranth, LLC, 
894 A.2d 1104 (Del. Ch. 2006).  The effect of this—and presumably why the hedge 
fund resisted—is that any settlement must be approved by the court and, moreover, 
that the class representative cannot settle separately. 
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quire LSE in 2000, DB announced a new bid in December 2004.62  
This quickly spurred Euronext, a competing exchange, to announce 
its interest in LSE.63
DB’s problems started in mid-January, when The Children’s In-
vestment Fund Management (TCI),64 a London-based hedge fund 
that had assembled more than a 5% stake in DB, announced its oppo-
sition.  TCI argued that using DB’s cash hoard to buy back shares 
“would be far superior in value creation.”65  Although the bid did not 
require shareholder approval, TCI held a large enough stake to call 
an extraordinary general meeting to dismiss DB’s supervisory board.66  
Around the same time, Atticus Capital, a US-based fund which then 
controlled around 2% of DB’s shares, joined TCI in opposing the 
bid.67  By February, DB shareholders holding about 35% of its stock 
(including several mutual funds), prompted by TCI and Atticus, were 
planning to confront DB.68  TCI started looking for a candidate to re-
place Rolf Breuer as DB’s chairman, and came up with Lord Jacob 
Rothschild,69 who, as it happens, was the father of the president of At-
ticus.70
In early March, DB’s CEO, Seifert, came to London to meet with 
the largest dissident shareholders, only to have the offer of a meeting 
62 Patrick Jenkins & Norma Cohen, Deutsche Börse Courts LSE for European Exchange 
Union, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 14, 2004, at 23. 
63 Norma Cohen, LSE War Looms as Euronext Confirms Intent, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Dec. 21, 2004, at 22. 
64 So named because 50% of TCI’s annual management fee is paid to The Chil-
dren’s Investment Fund Foundation, which funds development projects focused on 
children in developing nations.  Martin Waller, Fund Says Opposition to Börse’s LSE Bid Is 
Mounting, TIMES (London), Jan. 18, 2005, at Bus. 43. 
65 Richard Wray, Börse Rebel Threatens To Derail LSE Bid, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 
17, 2005, at 21. 
66 To call a meeting, TCI would have to register its shares with BaFin and hold 
them for three months.  Damian Reece, Börse Could Bid Pounds 1.7 bn for LSE, Says 
Deutsche, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 27, 2005, at 48. 
67 Norma Cohen, Deutsche Börse ‘Empire Building’, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 17, 
2005, at 19. 
68 Louise Armitstead, Shareholders Revolt in Bid to Topple Seifert, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Feb. 20, 2005, at Bus. 1; see also Julia Kollewe, Fidelity Joins Börse Shareholder 
Revolt, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 25, 2005, at 37 (indicating that Fidelity held more 
than a 4.5% stake). 
69 Louise Armitstead, Rothschild To Lead Battle for Börse Rebels, SUNDAY TIMES (Lon-
don), Feb. 27, 2005, at Bus. 1. 
70 Grant Ringshaw, Rothschilds Unite in Attack on Seifert, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (Lon-
don), Feb. 27, 2005, at City 1. 
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refused.71  With more than 40%, and as much as 60%, of the shares 
opposing the bid (depending on reports), DB abandoned its bid in 
early March and promised to develop a plan to distribute the cash.72  
As the participants celebrated the victory, the division of labor be-
tween hedge funds and traditional institutional investors became 
clear.  As the representative of one institutional investor said, “The 
hedge funds have done a marvelous job.  No matter how we feel about 
companies, traditional managers simply cannot move as fast to achieve 
our aims.  We were right behind [the hedge funds], but we couldn’t 
have done it without them.”73  In May 2005, Seifert resigned after DB’s 
chairman was ordered by the supervisory board “to change the com-
position of the Supervisory and Executive Boards in order to reflect 
the new ownership structure of the Company.”74
Other instances where hedge funds have sought to block an ac-
quisition in their role as the shareholders of the potential acquirer in-
clude Carl Icahn’s efforts to prevent Mylan Laboratories from acquir-
ing King Pharmaceuticals;75 Knight Vinke, which followed Templeton 
in opposing VNU’s proposed acquisition of IMS Health;76 Duquesne 
Capital Management, which opposed the proposed acquisition of Pub-
lic Service Enterprise Group by Exelon;77 OrbiMed Advisors, which 
succeeded in blocking the acquisition of EOS by Pharmacopia;78 and 
71 Norma Cohen & Patrick Jenkins, Deutsche Börse Withdraws LSE Offer, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Mar. 7, 2005, at 1. 
72 Id.; see also Deutsche Boerse Bows to the Might of Investment Funds, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
Mar. 7, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. AFPR000020050307e1370096q (describing DB’s 
actions as “effectively throwing in the towel in the face of fierce and long resistance to the 
deal on the part of private equity firms”); Danny Fortson, Deutsche Bvrse [sic] Drops LSE Hunt, 
THEDEAL.COM, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/ 
TDDArticle/TDStandardArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=1107993123143 (not-
ing DB’s plan to “redistribute funds to investors”). 
73 Louise Armitstead, Saved by the Growing Power of Hedge Funds, SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), Mar. 13, 2005, at Bus. 14 (alteration in original). 
74 Press Release, Deutsche Börse AG, Changes to the Boards of Deutsche Börse AG 
(May 9, 2005), available at http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbag/dispatch/en/listcontent/ 
gdb_navigation/investor_relations/60_News/20_Ad_hoc_Announcements/Content_Files/ 
10_adhoc/db_ad-hoc_090505.htm.  
75 See infra Part III.A.3. 
76 Dennis K. Berman & Jason Singer, VNU’s Largest Shareholders Deride Plan To Buy 
IMS Health, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1-2, 2005, at B3. 
77 Bloomberg News, Exelon Merger Criticized, CHI. TRIB., May 13, 2006, § 2, at 1. 
78 Pharmacopia and EOS Call Off Merger, S.F. BUS. TIMES (online edition), Jan. 18, 2002, 
http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2002/01/14/daily52.html. 
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Pirate Capital, Omega Advisors, and Jana Partners, which collectively 
opposed Mirant’s offer to acquire NRG.79
b.  Blocking Targets 
As shareholders of target companies, hedge funds have actively 
opposed several proposed acquisitions and have often succeeded in 
improving the terms of the transaction.  A recent example involved 
Novartis’s attempt to acquire the 58% of Chiron that it did not already 
own.  Novartis initially offered $40 per share to the Chiron sharehold-
ers.  An independent committee of Chiron negotiated this price up to 
$45 per share, a 23% premium over Chiron’s pre-offer share price.80  
One month after the agreement was announced, ValueAct Capital, a 
hedge fund and the third largest shareholder of Chiron, sent a “sting-
ing” letter to Chiron’s CEO announcing its opposition.81  This started 
a shareholder revolt, with mutual fund Legg Mason, the second larg-
est shareholder of Chiron, joining ValueAct’s opposition, and Institu-
tional Shareholder Services recommending a vote against the deal.82  
To get the transaction through, Novartis had to raise its offer to $48 a 
share,83 increasing the premium from 23% to 32%. 
The fate of the Chiron-Novartis deal is not unusual.  Other exam-
ples of hedge funds opposing acquisitions include Masonite Interna-
tional, where Eminence Capital and Greystone Management Invest-
ment succeeded in raising the price from C$40.20 to C$42.25;84 
ShopKo, where Elliott Management derailed a proposed acquisition 
79 Emma Trincal, Mirant Up on Activist Agitation, THESTREET.COM, June 21, 2006, 
http://www.thestreeet.com/markets/hedgefunds/10293003.html. 
80 Press Release, Novartis Int’l AG, Novartis Announces Agreement To Acquire 
Remaining Stake in Chiron (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://hugin.info/ 
134323/R/1018774/160041.pdf. 
81 Hamilton, supra note 13. 
82 Id. 
83 David P. Hamilton, Novartis Raises Chiron Bid, Virtually Sealing Deal, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 4, 2006, at A2. 
84 See Eminence Capital Presents Letter to Masonite Board of Directors, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 
27, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. PRN0000020050127e11r002jq (expressing dis-
content with the initial C$40.20 per share offer); Press Release, Masonite Int’l Corp., 
Masonite Shareholders Approve Proposed Acquisition by KKR, (Mar. 31, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.masonite.com/Globalpdf/pdfs/MasonitePressMarch31.pdf (an-
nouncing approval of the sale to KKR by 91.8% of nonsenior management sharehold-
ers after the higher price was offered). 
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for $24 a share;85 MONY, where Highfields led the opposition to the 
company’s acquisition by AXA;86 Molson, where Highfields forced 
Coors to improve the sale terms;87 VNU, where Knight Vinke Asset 
Management opposed the company’s acquisition by a consortium of 
private equity firms;88 Lexar Media, where Carl Icahn and Elliott Asso-
ciates opposed a merger with Micron;89 Sears Canada, where Pershing 
Square tried to hold out against a bid by Sears—itself a company run 
by hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert—to freeze out the minority 
shareholders;90 Titan International, where Jana Partners thwarted the 
company’s proposed acquisition by a private equity firm;91 and MCI, 
which faced the threat of a proxy contest by Deephaven Capital to de-
rail an acquisition by Verizon.92
When hedge funds are dissatisfied with the terms of an acquisition 
and unable to obtain better terms, they also resort to litigation.  In 
particular, hedge funds have filed statutory appraisal actions, in which 
shareholders receive a court-determined fair value instead of the 
merger consideration.  Take the acquisition of Emerging Communi-
cations (ECM) by its majority shareholder, Innovative Communica-
tions, for $10.25 per share.93  Greenlight Capital, a hedge fund, held 
about 500,000 shares in the company.  After the acquisition was an-
nounced, it increased its stake and sought appraisal for 750,300 
shares.94  As is commonplace in minority freeze-out mergers, a plain-
85 ShopKo Agrees to $29 a Share Offer from Sun Capital, BUS. J. MILWAUKEE (online 
edition), Oct. 19, 2005, http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2005/10/ 
17/daily17.html. 
86 See infra Part III.A.2. 
87 Innisfree Presentation, supra note 27, at slide 6. 
88 Singer, supra note 16. 
89 Chappell, supra note 15. 
90 Norris, supra note 14. 
91 Press Release, Titan Int’l, Inc., Titan International, Inc. Announces Termina-
tion of Proposed Buyout (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://www.titan-intl.com/ 
newsdirectory/041206.html. 
92 Dennis K. Berman & Almar Latour, Major MCI Holder Starts Proxy Fight To Thwart 
Verizon, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2005, at B3.  For additional accounts of hedge funds in-
terfering with acquisition bids, see, for example, Jason Singer, With Rising Clout, Hedge 
Funds Start To Sway Mergers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005, at A1. 
93 In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 70, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). 
94 Greenlight held shares in ECM before the merger was announced, but increased 
its stake by 264,700 shares between the announcement and the merger vote.  In its 
Schedule 13D, filed ten days later, Greenlight disclosed its intention to seek appraisal 
rights.  Greenlight Capital, L.L.C., General Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Schedule 
13D) (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsN7p.74d.htm#1stPage. 
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tiff’s law firm also filed a fiduciary duty action.95  The latter form of 
action often is settled for a relatively modest recovery (if any).96  But, 
in this case, when a settlement was proposed that provided for no ad-
ditional payments to shareholders and $115,000 in legal fees,97 
Greenlight, which had also acquired litigation rights for over 2 million 
ECM shares, objected.98  Both the appraisal and the fiduciary duty ac-
tion proceeded to trial, and the court determined that the fair value 
of an ECM share was $38.05.  Greenlight was awarded that amount 
plus compounded interest in its appraisal shares, as well as damages of 
$27.80 per share—the difference between the fair value and the 
merger consideration—in the fiduciary duty action.99
Other instances of hedge funds exercising appraisal rights include 
Gabelli Asset Management’s 2004 appraisal action against Carter Wal-
lace,100 Prescott Group’s appraisal against Coleman,101 and the pend-
ing appraisal action brought by Icahn and others in Transkaryotic 
Therapies, where hedge funds had tried, but failed, to block the ac-
quisition and decided to pursue appraisal instead of accepting the 
merger consideration.102
95 In re Emerging Commc’ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *3. 
96 See In re Cox Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 622 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(noting that the plaintiffs’ lawyers in a shareholder litigation were “pragmatic” in “tem-
per[ing] their fee requests” to seek a “relatively small percentage of the ‘benefits’”); 
Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride:  How Delaware Law 
(Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1833 (2004) (finding that 
settlements in squeeze-out cases provided for small recoveries). 
97 Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement at 10, Erickell Part-
ners v. Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., No. 16415-NC (Del. Ch. Jun. 27, 2000). 
98 In re Emerging Commc’ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *3-4. 
99 Id. at *155.  ECM has appealed the judgment to the Delaware Supreme Court, 
where the case is pending.  Tim Fields, ICC-LLC, Emcom File for Chapter 11, VIRGIN ISLANDS 
DAILY NEWS (online edition), Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/ 
index.pl/article_home?id=17594677. 
100 Press Release, GAMCO Investors, Inc., Gabelli Clients Realize a More Than 
40% Premium in Settlement of Carter-Wallace Appraisal Litigation (Nov. 1, 2004), 
available at http://www.gabelli.com/news/GBL_110104.html. 
101 Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. v. The Coleman Co., No. 17802, 2004 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 131 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004). 
102 See Latham & Watkins, Hedge Fund Activist M&A Investing, Presentation to the 
2006 Proxy Season Symposium, at Slide 11 (Nov. 1, 2005) (on file with authors) (not-
ing that “more than one third of Transkaryotic shares, including Icahn and other 
hedge funds, have exercised their appraisal rights” after the acquisition by Shire 
Pharmaceuticals). 
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c.  Making Bids 
Unlike traditional institutional investors, hedge funds not only 
urge portfolio companies to be acquired by third parties, but also 
make attempts to acquire these companies themselves.  These bids 
can be part of a strategy to improve the governance or capital struc-
ture of these companies or to put the target in play.  In other in-
stances, however, hedge funds have emerged as controlling share-
holders of large industrial corporations. 
As an example of an acquisition offer that induced corporate gov-
ernance changes, consider GenCorp.  GenCorp owned more than 
12,000 acres of undeveloped land in Sacramento, an asset that at-
tracted the interest of various investors.103  In November 2004, Steel 
Partners, a hedge fund, announced that it was interested in acquiring 
GenCorp for $17 per share.104  When the board rejected Steel Part-
ners’ advance, the fund threatened a proxy contest.105  By February 
2005, GenCorp and Steel Partners had agreed that Steel Partners 
would cast its votes in favor of GenCorp’s nominees, a representative 
of Steel Partners could attend board meetings, the board would ap-
point a new independent director with expertise in corporate govern-
ance (identified in consultation with Steel Partners), and the board 
would then consider corporate governance changes proposed by Steel 
Partners.106
ShopKo, a retail and pharmacy store chain, provides another illus-
tration of this approach.  ShopKo had agreed to be acquired by Gold-
ner Hawn, a private equity firm, for $24 per share.  But Elliott Associ-
ates, a hedge fund with a major stake in ShopKo, opposed the 
proposed deal. Together with Sun Capital, a private equity firm, and 
some other investors, Elliott made a counter bid of $26.50.  After an 
auction, the Elliott group succeeded in acquiring ShopKo for $29 a 
share.107
103 Gene G. Marcial, GenCorp’s Earthly Assets, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 100. 
104 Steel Partners Offers To Acquire the Outstanding Shares of GenCorp Inc. in  
Letter to Board, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 11, 2004, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
PRN0000020041111e0bb003ff. 
105 Ron Orol, GenCorp Rejects $700M Offer, THEDEAL.COM, Nov. 15, 2004, 
http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/TDDArticle/ 
TDStandardArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=1099927556612. 
106 Dale Kasler, GenCorp Reaches Truce with Firm That Made Hostile Bid, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, Feb. 17, 2005, at D1. 
107 ShopKo Agrees to $29 a Share Offer from Sun Capital, supra note 85. 
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Finally, take Kmart.  Kmart filed for bankruptcy in February 2002.  
When it emerged from Chapter 11 in May 2003,108 its largest share-
holder was the hedge fund ESL, run by Edward Lampert.  ESL owned 
about 50% of the company, having acquired $2 billion in financial 
claims (for somewhere around $200 million) that were converted into 
stock in the reorganization.109  At the time Kmart emerged from bank-
ruptcy, its stock opened at $15 per share and drifted downward.110  But 
by July 2004, Kmart’s stock was at $76 per share and Lampert, who 
had taken over the management of Kmart, was the toast of the town.111  
By unlocking the value of Kmart’s real estate through selling off 
stores, Kmart accumulated a “$2.2 billion cash hoard.”112  By Novem-
ber 2004, Lampert answered the market’s question of what he was go-
ing to do with all that money:  Kmart and Sears agreed to merge.113  
The news of the deal pushed Kmart stock up to $109 per share, and 
Sears shares rose as well.114
Additional examples of hedge funds making bids include Appa-
loosa Management, which made a bid for Beverly Enterprises;115 High-
108 To emerge from Chapter 11 in fifteen months is very quick for a major bank-
ruptcy, and can be explained by the incentives put in place for management.  See 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 673, 698 (2003) (attributing Kmart’s atypical emergence from Chapter 11 to 
Lampert’s control over the appointments to the board of directors and his stake in the 
reorganized business). 
109  Christopher Byron, Short-Sell Scramble; Investors Are Betting That Kmart Won’t 
Bounce Back, N.Y. POST, May 19, 2003, at 37; Week in Review:  Kmart out of Bankruptcy, 
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., May 12, 2003, at 34. 
110 Yural Rosenberg, The Man Behind the Deal, CNN MONEY, Nov. 17, 2004, 
http://money.cnn.com/2004/11/17/news/newsmakers/lampert. 
111 Becky Yerak, Exec Lifts Kmart’s Stock into Blue Yonder, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 2004, at 
C1. 
112 Robert Berner, Turning Kmart into a Cash Cow, BUS. WK., July 12, 2004, at 81, 81. 
113 Constance L. Hays, Kmart Takeover of Sears Is Set; $11 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2004, at A1. 
114 Id.  Prior to its investment in Kmart, ESL had owned a large block of Sears 
stock—a block which had increased to 15% by the time the merger was announced.  
See Merger at the Mall, ECONOMIST.COM, Nov. 17, 2004, http://www.economist.com/ 
agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3397862. 
115 Peter Moreira, Four Funds Bid for Beverly, THEDEAL.COM, Jan. 27, 2005, 
http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/TDDArticle/ 
TDStandardArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=1106611780237.  In response to 
the bid, the board of Beverly decided to auction the company, which was ultimately 
acquired by another bidder.  See Beverly Enterprises Receives Higher Bid, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
22, 2005, at C5; Peter Loftus, Beverly Enterprises Agrees to Bid by Fillmore Despite Better Offer, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2005, at C4; Peter Loftus, Beverly Enterprises To Be Acquired by Inves-
tor Group for $1.63 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2005, at A5. 
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fields, which made a bid to acquire Circuit City;116 ValueAct, which re-
peatedly attempted to acquire Acxiom;117 and Jana Partners, which 
made a bid for Houston Exploration.118
B.  Activism by Traditional Institutions Compared 
Over the last twenty years, traditional institutional investors—
specifically public pension funds and mutual funds—have also en-
gaged in shareholder activism.  The mode of this activism, however, 
differs in important respects from activism by hedge funds. 
Activism by traditional institutions generally falls into two catego-
ries.  Starting in the mid-1980s, and continuing to a limited extent un-
til today, traditional institutions have made shareholder proposals un-
der Rule 14a-8.  These proposals are usually precatory resolutions that 
relate to various aspects of the corporate governance rules, such as 
poison pills, confidential voting, and board structure.  Most of these 
proposals were introduced by public pension funds—including 
CalPERS, various New York pension funds, and the State of Wisconsin 
Investment Board—and by TIAA-CREF.119  Since the mid-1990s, how-
ever, institutions have increasingly engaged in private negotiations to 
get boards to make governance changes voluntarily and have only re-
sorted to formal proposals in some of the instances where boards 
failed to do so.120
116 Michael Barbaro, Circuit City Rejects Hedge Fund’s Cash Bid, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 
2005, at E5; see also Gary McWilliams, Circuit City Rejects Takeover Bid, Won’t Consider Any 
Other Offers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2005, at A8 (reporting the bid by Highfields for Circuit 
City and noting the increasing interest among hedge funds in pursuing takeovers). 
117 Richard H. Levey, ValueAct Redoubles Acxiom Takeover Effort, DIRECT (online edi-
tion), Oct. 4, 2005, http://directmag.com/news/valueact-acxiom-takeover-100505. 
118 Cauchi, supra note 10. 
119 For discussion of these proposals, see generally Diane Del Guercio & Jennifer 
Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 293 
(1999); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder 
Activism:  The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275 (2000); Jonathan M. 
Karpoff et al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives:  Empirical Evidence, 42 J. 
FIN. ECON. 365 (1996); Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors:  
Evidence from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227 (1996). 
120 See William T. Carleton et al., The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance 
Through Private Negotiations:  Evidence from TIAA-CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1336 (1998) 
(emphasizing “the importance of private negotiations between institutions and corpo-
rations”); Gillan & Starks, supra note 119, at 279 (“[I]nstitutional investors began hav-
ing more direct negotiation with company management and less reliance on proxy 
proposals.”); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance, Corporate Owner-
ship, and the Role of Institutional Investors:  A Global Perspective,  J. APPLIED FIN., 
Fall/Winter 2003, at 4, 10 (noting that institutional shareholders had shifted away 
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Seeking governance changes through (actual or threatened) 
shareholder proposals has largely been the domain of public pension 
funds.121  Other than TIAA-CREF, mutual funds have not themselves 
been active in this strategy, whether initially or after failed private ne-
gotiations.  Mutual funds have, however, voted in favor of proposals 
introduced by others.  In addition, mutual funds have adopted poli-
cies to vote against certain changes in governance rules that entrench 
the current board if such changes are proposed by the board of direc-
tors, and these funds have sometimes withheld votes (i.e., abstained) 
in director elections.122
These activities differ from activism by hedge funds in a variety of 
ways.  They are directed to changes in the corporate governance rules, 
rather than to specific aspects of a company’s business or manage-
ment (such as share buy-backs, spin-offs, mergers, or the composition 
of the board of directors).  In addition, the effect of the policy 
changes sought is usually minor, either because the subject matter is 
not very important,123 because the shareholder resolution is precatory 
(and a favorable vote is thus not binding), or because a board, even if 
it agrees to adopt the proposed policy, is free to change it later.  To 
the extent that the “activism” takes the form of merely voting in favor 
of proposals by others (or against proposals made by the company’s 
board), it represents a rather passive form of “activism.”  Finally, a 
group of portfolio companies tends to be targeted at the same time,124 
and often with respect to the same governance changes. 
from their previous tactic of shareholder proposals toward “negotiating directly with 
corporate management”). 
121 More recently, union-affiliated pension funds have increasingly sponsored 
shareholder proposals.  Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate 
Governance:  Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019-20 (1998). 
122 See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Recon-
sidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 834 tbl.5 (1993) (categorizing institutional investors’ 
proxy voting policies).  Public pension funds—but not mutual funds—have also in-
creasingly applied to become lead plaintiffs in securities fraud class action lawsuits.  
Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:  Changes 
During the First Era After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1507 (2006).  Securities 
fraud class actions, however, are at the periphery of corporate governance and control 
activities. 
123 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 
465, 506 (2003) (concluding that confidential voting proposals are immaterial). 
124 See, e.g., Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Focus List Targets Six Underper-
forming Companies (Apr. 19, 2006), available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/ 
index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2006/april/focus-list.xml (illustrating CalPERS’s prac-
tice of compiling an annual “Focus List” to channel its activism). 
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Viewed charitably, this mode of activism is designed to achieve 
small changes in multiple companies at little expense, but it is unlikely 
to result in big changes in specific companies.  The prominent role of 
proxy advisory firms like Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) is 
consistent with this focus on small, low cost, systemic changes. 
The second category of activities by traditional institutions consists 
of “behind-the-scenes” discussions with company management and 
board members.125  From what has become known about these activi-
ties after the fact, it appears that they seek the same modest changes 
in governance rules as do shareholder proposals.  For example, Carle-
ton, Nelson, and Weisbach, who obtained access to the private corre-
spondence between TIAA-CREF and portfolio firms, report that the 
changes sought involved confidential voting, board diversity, and limi-
tations on targeted stock placements.126  Known instances of institu-
tions seeking more far-reaching changes are rare and often involve 
unusual fact patterns.127
As to activities that have remained nonpublic, we, of course, do 
not know their scale and scope.  But we consider it unlikely that such 
activities resemble the activism of hedge funds.  It is implausible that 
institutions could often succeed in achieving major changes through 
behind-the-scenes discussions without their efforts becoming public.128  
After all, if management is not receptive to the proposed changes, the 
125 See, e.g., Carleton et al., supra note 120 (analyzing the influence of TIAA-CREF 
over corporate governance through private negotiations); Gillan & Starks, supra note 
120, at 11-12 (discussing “behind the scenes” activism and providing examples of its 
use by TIAA-CREF and CalPERS). 
126 Carleton et al., supra note 120, at 1346 tbl.2; see also Allen R. Myerson, The New 
Activism at Fidelity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, § 3, at 15 (discussing letters that Fidelity 
sent to one hundred companies opposing certain executive pay plans); Alan Murray, 
At AIG, a First Glance at ‘Good Governance’, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2006, at A2 (noting that 
public pension funds induced governance changes at AIG, including separating the 
posts of chairman and CEO, increasing the number of independent board members, 
and “[r]equiring independent board members to meet in ‘executive session’”). 
127 For example, Fidelity had one of its employees appointed as CEO of Colt Tele-
com.  Gillan & Starks, supra note 120, at 10.  But Colt was unusual in that it was 
founded by Fidelity, was close to bankruptcy, and Fidelity held 54% of its stock.  See Colt 
Names Fidelity’s Akin To Replace CEO Manning, BOSTON BUS. J. (online edition), July 24, 
2002, http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2002/07/22/daily33.html. 
128 Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing:  Will It Happen?  Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1009, 1030 (1994) (observing that institutions considering “more activist efforts to 
influence corporate policy . . . do not appear convinced that the game is worth the 
candle”); Leon Lazaroff, Hedge Fund Activist Turns Up Heat, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 2005, § 
5, at 7 (quoting an investor as saying, “rarely do you hear a mutual fund manager make 
a sound,” as an indication of passivity among institutional investors). 
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institution must either give up or go public.  And if management 
knows that institutions are reluctant to go public, it has little incentive 
to accede to the request for change.  Moreover, the leverage that insti-
tutions can exercise behind the scenes is limited.  If an institution 
wanted to coordinate its pressure with those of other institutions, it 
could become engaged in a solicitation or in the formation of a 
“group” within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act, which of-
ten would require a public filing.129  The scarcity of such filings and 
the absence of any reports to the contrary suggest that traditional in-
stitutions do not coordinate their behind-the-scenes pressure.  We are 
skeptical whether uncoordinated pressure by a single institution will 
often result in meaningful change. 
This being said, traditional institutions have recently, in the wake 
of hedge fund activism, become somewhat more active in matters in-
volving corporate control.  Thus, as discussed above, Franklin Mutual 
Advisers, an investment adviser for mutual funds and other accounts, 
has joined forces with a hedge fund and other investors in making a 
bid for Beverly Enterprises.130  Additionally, mutual funds have sup-
ported the efforts of hedge funds to block the acquisition of the Lon-
don Stock Exchange by Deutsche Bank, of Chiron by Novartis, of 
MONY by AXA, and of IMS Health by VNU.131  And we suspect that 
there are additional examples where traditional institutions have ex-
pressed support for hedge funds in private communications with 
management.  Hedge funds, it thus appears, have not just been activist 
themselves; they have also been a catalyst for activism by traditional 
institutions conducted jointly with, or in the wake of, hedge funds.132
129 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)(3), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78m(d)(3), 78n(a) (2000) (imposing disclosure obligations on “groups” of sharehold-
ers).  By contrast, the tendency of hedge funds to conduct their activism in public re-
duces the need for public disclosure of any coordination.  See  infra Part III.B.1. 
130 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
131 See supra notes 62-88 and accompanying text.  This kind of activism is rela-
tively novel for mutual funds.  See Ann Carrns, Putnam Cites Price in Plan To Vote 
Against WaMu’s Providian Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2005, at C3 (quoting a bank ana-
lyst as describing the public opposition to acquisition by a mutual fund as “a little bit 
unusual”). 
132 See Client Memorandum from Andrew R. Brownstein & Trevor S. Norwitz, 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context (May 15, 
2006) [hereinafter Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context] (on file with authors) 
(“Even traditional long-term institutional investors are on occasion becoming more 
outspoken than they have been in the past.  The fusion of aggressive hedge fund activ-
ism and the power of large institutional holders is a potent formula that can energize 
an activist campaign.”).  The willingness of traditional institutions to become involved 
in activism with hedge funds may be enhanced by the adoption of Regulation FD, 
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C.  Hedge Fund Activism in Perspective 
In assessing the many instances where hedge funds have adopted 
an activist posture in corporate governance and control transactions, 
one has to keep in mind that only a minority of hedge funds pursue 
shareholder activism.  Some hedge funds do not own many equity se-
curities because they pursue macroeconomic strategies or because 
they invest primarily in debt securities.133  And even most hedge funds 
that focus on equity securities are not activist, because they pursue 
quantitative strategies, because they value their relationship with man-
agement, or for other reasons.134  Indeed, according to a recent esti-
mate by J.P. Morgan, only 5% of hedge fund assets, or about $50 bil-
lion, are available for shareholder activism.135
Our point in discussing hedge fund activism is thus not that 
shareholder activism is predominant among hedge funds.  It is not.  
Our point is rather that hedge funds—to the virtual exclusion of tradi-
tional institutional investors—dominate certain modes of shareholder 
activism.  The fact that only a minority of hedge funds engages in such 
activism makes this point, if anything, even more noteworthy. 
But the fact that, at present, only a minority of hedge funds is en-
gaged in shareholder activism is important for another reason as well.  
It indicates that there is a large untapped fund of money that could 
quickly become available for activism.  If activist strategies are profit-
able—more so than the other investment strategies hedge funds pur-
sue—it would not take much for the capital devoted to activism to 
which made it harder for management to retaliate against institutional investors by en-
gaging in selective disclosure of information.  See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2006) (prevent-
ing selective disclosure by requiring the immediate public disclosure of any material 
nonpublic information intentionally disclosed by the issuer); see also Black, Shareholder 
Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 602 (hypothesizing that mutual funds may be 
passive because of a fear of such retaliation). 
133 For a table detailing the assets under management by various hedge fund 
strategies, see The Barclay Group, Hedge Fund Industry—Assets Under Management, 
http://www.barclaygrp.com/indices/ghs/mum/HF_Money_Under_Management.html 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
134 See, e.g., Richard Dobbs & Timothy Koller, Inside a Hedge Fund:  An Interview with 
the Managing Partner of Maverick Capital, MCKINSEY ON FINANCE (McKinsey & Co.), 
Spring 2006, at 6, 9-10, (quoting Lee Ainslie, the managing partner of Maverick Capi-
tal, who explains that his fund puts a “premium on the value of our relationships with 
management teams”). 
135 J.P. MORGAN, GLOBAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS REVIEW 89 (2006) (on file 
with authors). 
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double or even quadruple overnight.136  Thus, whatever the extent of 
hedge fund activism today, it may become much larger—or much 
smaller—tomorrow. 
II.  HEDGE FUNDS AS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
The activities of hedge funds described in Part I give substance to 
the hope that hedge funds may act “like real owners” and provide a 
check on management discretion.  But similar hopes were generated 
in the 1980s, when commentators noted that a significant shift in the 
shareholder profile of public corporations—from small individual 
shareholders to large institutional holders—had taken place.137  The 
rise of institutional investors, starting in the early 1990s, generated a 
series of articles analyzing the potential implications of institutional 
shareholdings on corporate governance.138
In this Part, we analyze hedge funds against the backdrop of the 
analysis of traditional institutional investors.  Our comparison focuses 
on open-ended mutual funds, both because mutual funds are the 
most important institutional investors, holding about 24% of all cor-
porate equities,139 and because they are economically closest to hedge 
funds.  But we also discuss, more briefly, public pension funds, the 
third-largest category of traditional institutions, which hold 10.5% of 
corporate equities.140
136 Unlike mutual funds, which must abide by the investment policies described in 
their registration statement or obtain shareholder approval for a change, see Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 § 8(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(2) (2000), hedge funds 
can quickly change their policies to respond to new profit opportunities. 
137 According to the Federal Reserve Board, the percentage ownership of corpo-
rate equities by households declined from 70% in 1975 to 56% in 1984, while owner-
ship by pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds increased from 25% to 
37%.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1975-1984, at 82 tbl.L.213 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
RELEASES/z1/current/annuals/a1975-1984.pdf.  This trend has continued, with the 
ownership by households declining to 28% in the Third Quarter of 2006 and owner-
ship by insurance companies, pensions, and mutual funds increasing to nearly 55%.  
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, THIRD QUARTER 2006, at 90 tbl.L.213 (2006) [hereinafter FLOW OF 
FUNDS ACCOUNTS], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20061207/ 
z1.pdf. 
138 See, e.g., Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 25; Rock, supra note 25. 
139 According to the Federal Reserve, mutual funds in the Third Quarter of 2006 
held $4597 of $19,306 billion (24%) of corporate equities.  FLOW OF FUNDS AC-
COUNTS, supra note 137, at 90 tbl.L.213. 
140 Id.  Private pension funds, the second largest holder, owned another 12.8% of 
corporate equities.  Id.  We do not further discuss corporate pension funds for several 
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A.  Mutual Funds and Monitoring 
1.  The Pluses:  Size and Expertise 
Compared to individual investors, mutual funds enjoy a major ad-
vantage as corporate monitors:  they are large.  The average size of an 
equity mutual fund was $218 million in 1990 and $964 million in 
2004.141  The largest mutual funds manage assets in the tens of billions 
of dollars.142  In comparison, the average capitalization of stocks is $25 
billion in the S&P 500 Index143 and $2.8 billion in the S&P MidCap 
Index.144
Due to their size, mutual funds enjoy significant economies of 
scale that arise in two ways.  For one, they will tend to own a greater 
number of shares of an individual company than individual investors 
do.  To the extent that governance activities entail company-specific 
costs, these costs can be spread over a larger investment.  Moreover, 
mutual funds will tend to own shares in a larger number of companies 
than individual investors do.  To the extent that governance activities 
entail costs that are common for several companies, these costs can be 
spread over a larger number of investments. 
2.  The Minuses:  Regulation, Incentive Problems, and Conflicts 
Mutual funds also suffer from a number of disadvantages that im-
pede their ability to act as effective monitors.  These disadvantages fall 
into three categories:  regulatory constraints, inadequate incentives, 
and conflicts of interest.145
reasons:  they hold fewer assets than mutual funds, the literature on institutional inves-
tors has expressed skepticism about whether corporate funds will be activist, and cor-
porate funds, unlike public funds, have not been activist. 
141 See INV. CO. INST., 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 61 tbl.3, 63 tbl.5 
(45th ed. 2005). 
142 For example, Vanguard’s S&P 500 Index fund has assets of $121.2 billion.  
Vanguard, Vanguard 500 Index Fund Investor Shares, 
http://flagship2.vanguard.com/ 
VGApp/hnw/FundsHoldings?FundId=0040&FundIntExt=INT (last visited Mar. 26, 
2007). 
143 Standard & Poors, S&P 500 (Dec. 31, 2006), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/ 
spf/pdf/index/500factsheet.pdf. 
144 Standard & Poors, S&P MidCap 400 (Dec. 31, 2006), http:// 
www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/400factsheet.pdf. 
145 See generally Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 25, at 873-76 (examining 
the factors influencing institutional investors’ effectiveness as monitors); Rock, supra 
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a.  Regulatory Constraints 
Mutual funds are subject to a number of regulatory constraints 
that can affect their ability and incentives to monitor portfolio com-
panies.  For one, mutual funds are subject to special disclosure re-
quirements not applicable to other types of investors.  Specifically, 
mutual funds must file semiannual lists showing the amounts and val-
ues of the securities they own.146  This makes it harder for mutual 
funds to accumulate positions in portfolio companies without such 
companies, and the market at large, becoming aware of their activi-
ties. 
In addition, in order to qualify for significant tax benefits, mutual 
funds must comply with the diversification requirements in subchap-
ter M of the Internal Revenue Code.  Accordingly, 50% of the assets of 
a mutual fund are subject to the limitations that the fund may own no 
more than 10% of the outstanding securities of a portfolio company, 
and that the stock of any portfolio company may not constitute more 
than 5% of the value of the assets of the fund.147  Moreover, in order 
to advertise themselves as “diversified”—the preferred mode for most 
funds148—funds must further satisfy the diversification requirements 
of the Investment Company Act.  Under the Act, 75% of the assets of a 
mutual fund are subject to the above limitation that the fund may own 
no more than 10% of the outstanding securities of a portfolio com-
pany and that the stock of any portfolio company may not constitute 
more than 5% of the value of the assets of the fund.149  These diversi-
fication requirements, in principle, limit the ability of funds to take 
large positions in a single company, though the constraints they pose 
may not be binding for larger mutual funds. 
Open-end mutual funds, by definition and by statute, must also 
stand ready to redeem their shares at the request of any shareholder 
note 25 (analyzing the interaction between collective action and agency costs in influ-
encing institutional shareholder activism). 
146 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 29(e), 15 U.S.C. §80a-29(e) (2000).  In ad-
dition, under a recently passed regulation, mutual funds must disclose how they voted 
any shares of their portfolio companies.  17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2006); see also Disclo-
sure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (describing the purpose of 
the regulation). 
147 Roe, supra note 25, at 20. 
148 Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1469, 1474 (1991). 
149 Roe, supra note 25, at 19-20 (summarizing the restrictions placed on mutual 
funds by 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b) (2000)). 
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at short notice.150  The redemption price of these shares is based on 
the fund’s net asset value.  These requirements make it difficult for 
mutual funds to have illiquid investments, such as restricted securities, 
as illiquid investments cannot be readily transformed into cash when 
fund shareholders want to redeem their shares and cannot be easily 
valued.  In light of this limitation, the staff of the SEC issued a guide-
line limiting the aggregate holdings of a mutual fund in illiquid in-
vestments to no more than 15% of the fund’s net assets.151
Finally, regulations make it difficult for mutual funds to base the 
fee paid to the fund management company on the performance of 
the fund.  Performance fees must be symmetrical, such that if fees are 
higher than normal after a good year, they must also be lower than 
normal after a bad year.152  But even symmetrical pay-for-performance 
fees are rendered impracticable by the requirement that performance 
fees be based on a period of at least one year.  Thus, if a fund has a 
stellar performance in one month, fund managers will likely earn an 
increased performance fee for the following eleven months.  This, of 
course, creates incentives for investors to sell their shares at the end of 
the first month, when they have fully benefited from the stellar per-
formance in that month but only paid one-twelfth of the associated per-
formance fee, and discourages investors from buying shares in a fund 
after a strong month, as they have to pay eleven-twelfths of the per-
formance fee without getting the benefit of the stellar performance. 
b.  Incentives To Monitor 
Activism of the variety described in Part I is not cheap.  Fund 
managers first have to identify a company that would benefit from ac-
tivism and develop a strategy for the company that would raise its 
share price.  Then fund mangers have to pressure the company’s 
management to adopt that strategy.  All of this consumes significant 
resources, both in-house and from hiring outside advisors. 
For mutual funds, the incentives to expend resources on such ac-
tivism are limited to begin with.153  The lack of incentives is particu-
150 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2000). 
151 Eleanor Laise, Mutual Funds Delve into Private Equity, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2006, 
at D1. 
152 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b) to (c) 
(2000).  Hedge fund advisors are typically exempt from registration and from § 205 
under the so-called “private adviser” provision of 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000). 
153 See Rock, supra note 25, at 472-76 (discussing the collective action problem in-
herent in mutual fund shareholder activism). 
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larly pronounced for managers of indexed funds.  The job of index 
fund managers is to replicate the performance of the index.  An index 
fund thus competes with other funds replicating the same index prin-
cipally on the basis of fund expenses.  As activism is costly and raises 
the fund’s expenses (or lowers the managing company’s profits), in-
dex fund managers will be reluctant to engage in activism. 
There is often a similar shortage of incentives for diversified mutual 
funds.  As previously discussed, regulatory barriers make it difficult for 
mutual funds to charge performance-based fees.  As a result, 97% of all 
funds, accounting for 92% of all mutual fund assets, charge fees based 
on a flat percentage of the fund’s assets under management.154  Asset-
based fees, however, provide only small direct incentives to engage in 
costly activism.  The median stock fund in 2004 charged investors total 
expenses of 1.45% of assets, of which roughly half were management 
fees.155  Thus, for example, when a manager of a $1 billion mutual fund 
earns additional profits of $100 million (a 10% return), total annual fees 
increase by $1.45 million and management fees increase by about 
$750,000.  Of course, a portion of these increased fees covers increased 
expenses associated with running a larger fund, and fees do not increase 
at all to the extent that investors withdraw some of the profits.  To get a 
sense of how much a fund management company benefits from the in-
creased profits, assume that $1 million of the $1.45 million in total in-
creased fees constitutes profits for the fund managers and that investors 
keep any profits in the fund for three years before withdrawing them.  
Applying a 5% discount rate, the $100 million in fund profits would 
then generate $2.85 million in additional profits for the fund manage-
ment company—amounting to a very modest implicit performance fee 
of 2.85%.  Even this rough estimate probably overstates the implicit per-
formance fees because most larger funds utilize “breakpoints,” where 
the marginal percentage fee declines as fund assets increase.156
154 See Jesse Eisinger, Pay-for-Performance Bedevils Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 
2005, at C1 (“Only 3% of mutual funds charge performance fees.  Such funds . . . make 
up less than 8% of the . . . assets in mutual funds.”). 
155 See Oversight Hearing on Mutual Funds:  Hidden Fees, Misgovernance and Other Prac-
tices that Harm Investors:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, 
and International Security of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 189, 193 
(2004) (prepared statement of Jeffrey C. Keil, Vice President, Lipper Inc.) [hereinafter 
Lipper Testimony] (providing data on management fees and total expenses in 1992 
and 2002-2003); John Waggoner, Many More Stock Funds Lower Management Fees After 
Scandal in 2003, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 2005, at 5B (observing a reduction in average 
fund fees from 1.50% to 1.45% in 2004). 
156 Lipper Testimony, supra note 155, at 190. 
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Even for the few funds that charge explicit performance fees, in-
centives are not much stronger.  In order to avoid the problem of stra-
tegic timing of withdrawals and contributions described above, the 
mutual fund performance fees that do exist are relatively flat.  Fidel-
ity’s Magellan Fund, for example, charges a performance adjustment 
of 0.02% of assets for each percentage point of outperformance or 
underperformance relative to the S&P 500 Index, up to a maximum 
of plus or minus 0.2%.157  This is the equivalent of an annual perform-
ance fee of 2% of the fund’s profits (as long as the profits are within 
the range where the performance adjustment is made).158   
Mutual funds, of course, also can benefit from good performance 
indirectly.  Studies have shown that funds that outperform their peers 
generally attract inflows of new assets.  A recent study by Stephen Choi 
and one of the authors of this Article, for example, finds that a 1% ab-
normal positive performance by a fund (relative to other funds with the 
same investment objective) is associated with increased inflows of 
roughly 1% over the following year, while a 1% abnormal negative per-
formance is associated with outflows of about 0.6% over a year.159  In-
creased inflows, of course, generate management and other asset-based 
fees.  The implicit performance fee generated indirectly by the effect of 
positive performance on inflows is, thus, roughly of the same magnitude 
as the implicit performance fee generated directly by asset-based fees. 
In one important respect, however, the incentive effect of per-
formance on net assets via inflows differs from the incentive effect of 
performance on net assets via profits.  While the latter is a function of 
the fund’s absolute performance, the former turns on a fund’s per-
formance relative to other funds with similar investment objectives.160  Activ-
157 Fidelity Magellan Fund, Management Contract Between Fidelity Magellan 
Fund and Fidelity Management & Research Company (Exhibit 5(a) to Form N-1A), at 
¶ 3(c) (May 22, 1998). 
158 FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, PROSPECTUS, FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND 21 (May 30, 2006), 
available at http://personal.fidelity.com/products/funds/mfl_frame.shtml?316184100. 
159 See Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals 3 
(N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 43, 2006), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/43 (providing an overview of the literature 
analyzing the effect of past performance on fund flows); see also Richard A. Ippolito, 
Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality:  Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry, 35 
J.L. & ECON. 45, 55, 67 (1992) (explaining investor responses to fund performance). 
160 See Fisch, supra note 128, at 1020 (“Their [mutual funds’] performance is 
evaluated not in absolute terms, but based on whether they are able to generate a 
higher rate of return than the competition or than the market.”); Jeffrey Ubben & 
David Haarmeyer, With Activism Comes Accountability, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR’S ALPHA, 
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ism, however, will increase a fund’s relative returns only to the extent 
that the fund has a higher stake in the portfolio company (relative to 
the fund size) than competing funds do and the costs of activism to 
the fund are less than the profits from that differential.  For any given 
portfolio company, this means that funds with a below-average stake in 
the company (relative to fund size) have no incentives—or indeed 
negative incentives—to take action to increase that company’s value, 
and funds with an above-average stake have only attenuated incentives 
to expend resources on activism.161
 
Table 1:  Top 10 Magellan Holdings Relative to S&P 500 Index162
 
Company 
Magellan
Investment 
(in %) 
Vanguard 
500 Index 
(in %) Difference
Dilution of  
Magellan’s  
Incentices 
GE 4.1 3.4 0.7 83% 
Microsoft 3.0 2.6 0.4 87% 
Exxon Mobil 3.0 2.9 0.1 97% 
Citigroup 2.7 2.2 0.5 81% 
AIG 2.7 1.5 1.2 56% 
Home Depot 2.2 0.8 1.4 36% 
Bank of America 2.2 1.7 0.5 77% 
Viacom 2.1 0.5 1.6 24% 
Pfizer 2.0 1.8 0.2 90% 
Tyco Int’l 1.9 0.6 1.3 32% 
All 10 stocks 25.9% 18% 7.9 69% (weighted) 
 
For example, Table 1 above lists the ten largest stock holdings—as 
of March 31, 2005—of the Fidelity Magellan Fund and the compara-
 
July/Aug. 2006, at 60, 60 (“[P]erformance of traditional money managers is measured 
on a relative, not an absolute, basis.”). 
161 See Rock, supra note 25, at 472-73 (discussing the collective action problem that 
forms in this context).  And even funds with an above-average stake relative to fund 
size have incentives to expend material resources only if the stake is significant in abso-
lute terms. 
162 See Fidelity Magellan Fund, Certified Shareholder Report (Form N-CSR) (May 
27, 2005); Vanguard Index Funds, Certified Shareholder Report (Form N-CSR) (Feb. 
25, 2005). 
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ble holdings in these companies—as of December 31, 2004—of the 
Vanguard 500 Index Fund. 
The last column of the table indicates the degree to which the 
Magellan Fund’s incentives to monitor are diluted by the fact that any 
increase in the value of these shares would not also raise the S&P 500 
index.  As the table shows, the degree of dilution is significant even 
for the largest holdings of the fund.  For smaller holdings, the degree 
of dilution is likely to be even higher.163
c.  Conflicts of Interest 
Mutual funds also suffer from conflicts of interest between fund 
managers and fund beneficiaries that inhibit their activities as moni-
tors of portfolio companies.164  Many mutual fund management com-
panies are affiliated with—and are, in effect, subsidiaries of and con-
trolled by—another financial institution, such as an investment bank 
or an insurance company.  For example, of the twenty largest mutual 
fund complexes in 2003, nine had such affiliations.165  Managers of 
such funds may be reluctant to antagonize present or future clients of 
their parent company with their governance activities.  Indeed, the ef-
163 For example, for the ten companies in the Magellan Fund’s “Consumer Sta-
ples” industry group, which account for 7.9% of the fund assets, the weighted average 
dilution is 78%.  As further discussed below, the degree of dilution in incentives is en-
dogenous as it is a function of a fund’s investment portfolio, which itself will be a func-
tion of the fund’s desire to engage in activism.  See infra Part II.C.5.  For purposes of 
this Section, however, we use a fund’s portfolio as a starting point to determine the 
incentive to engage in activism given the portfolio choice. 
164 See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 595-608 (examining 
the conflicts of interest that affect institutional shareholders); Rock, supra note 25, at 
469-72 (noting the divergent interests that give rise to this conflict); John C. Bogle, Op-
Ed., Individual Stockholder, R.I.P., WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at A16 (noting the conflicts 
that can be created by large corporate clients at financial institutions that manage both 
pension plans and mutual funds).  Conflicts are regarded as particularly pronounced 
in defined benefit plans, where fund assets are usually managed by designated corpo-
rate pension fund managers.  The managers of a corporate pension fund are ap-
pointed by the executives of the corporation that sponsors the pension plan.  These 
executives are believed to pressure pension fund managers to cast pro-management 
votes.  Accordingly, corporate pension funds have not become active in corporate gov-
ernance and are not regarded as likely to do so.  Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 
supra note 25, at 596-98. 
165 The list of funds was derived from a study sent by Fidelity to the SEC.  Letter 
from Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fidelity Mgmt. & Re-
search Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 18, 2004), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/fidelity031804.htm (including 
a study by Geoffrey H. Bobroff and Thomas H. Mack assessing the potential impact of 
independent board chairs on mutual fund performance). 
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fect of such affiliations on governance activism may be both more sub-
tle and more pervasive.  Consider, for example, a mutual fund affili-
ated with an investment bank.  The mutual fund managers will, ex 
ante, often not know which portfolio companies have hired, or are 
about to hire, the investment bank as an underwriter or financial advi-
sor.  And, ex post, the investment banker, for public relations and le-
gal reasons,166 would not want to interfere directly with the govern-
ance activism of the mutual fund when an investment banking client 
becomes the target of such activism.  Thus, the easiest and safest way 
to avoid any problems is for affiliated mutual funds not to engage in 
governance activism at all.167  This way, mutual fund managers do not 
have to distinguish between portfolio companies that are investment 
banking clients and those that are not, and investment bankers do not 
have to worry about mutual fund managers interfering with their 
business. 
Of course, many mutual fund companies, including the two larg-
est—Fidelity and Vanguard—are not affiliated with other financial in-
stitutions.  But even unaffiliated mutual fund managers, especially the 
larger ones, face potential conflicts.  For many mutual fund com-
plexes, the management of corporate pension plans is an important 
source of revenues.168  Governance activism could lead to a loss of 
such business, not just with respect to the activist fund, but for the 
complex as a whole.169  John Bogle, the founder and former head of 
166 The potential pitfalls facing a mutual fund are illustrated by the publicity that 
resulted when Deutsche Asset Management, an affiliate of Deutsche Bank, switched its 
votes from “against” to “for” the merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq, after it 
learned that Deutsche Bank provided investment banking advice to HP.  See Press Re-
lease, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm, SEC Brings Settled Enforcement Action Against 
Deutsche Bank Investment Advisory Unit in Connection with Its Voting of Client Prox-
ies for Merger Transaction; Imposes $750,000 Penalty (Aug. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2003-100.htm. 
167 Cf. Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, J. 
FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 18), available at http://www.london.edu/ 
assets/documents/PDF/davis_kim_05.pdf (finding that voting by mutual funds ap-
pears to be independent of whether the fund has client ties with the portfolio com-
pany, but noting that funds with multiple clients are generally more likely to vote in 
favor of management). 
168 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Investors vs. Pfizer:  Guess Who Has the Guns?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 3, at 1 (noting Pfizer’s influence as a client to several of its insti-
tutional shareholders). 
169 See, e.g., Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 602 (observing 
that Armstrong World Industries transferred its employee savings plan business from 
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Vanguard, even suggested that merely voting against management 
could “jeopardize the retention of clients of 401(k) and pension ac-
counts.”170  And Don Phillips, a managing director of Morningstar, at-
tributes the reluctance of funds to support shareholder proposals to 
rein in executive pay to their “desire to solicit business from corpora-
tions.”171  As in the case of affiliated funds, the effect of such conflicts 
on governance activism may be to deter strong activism on a broader 
scale.  It is certainly easy to imagine a mutual fund complex conclud-
ing that having the reputation as a governance troublemaker is not 
conducive to being picked as manager for corporate pension plans 
and that the profits to be made from managing these pension plans 
would exceed those from governance activism. 
To assess the significance of these conflicts of interest, one must 
compare them to the affirmative incentives a fund would have, absent 
any conflicts, to engage in activism.  As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, activism is costly, and fund management companies only profit 
modestly from any fund profits generated by activism.  Thus, in our 
view, even modest conflicts of interest can easily dissuade a fund man-
agement company from pursuing an activist strategy and induce it to 
rely instead on less conflict-prone strategies—such as quantitative re-
search or fundamental value analysis—to generate excess returns. 
d.  Concluding Remarks 
The actual activities of mutual funds are consistent with our analy-
sis.  Mutual funds have shied away from the more costly and more 
confrontational modes of activism.  They have not instigated proxy 
contexts or led the charge in pushing for changes in business strategy 
and management.  Most mutual funds have not even made share-
holder proposals, and, until recently, mutual funds have rarely been 
active in opposing or triggering corporate control transactions.  If 
they engage in behind-the-scenes communications—and we doubt 
that they do so extensively—these communications are largely just 
that:  efforts to coax management to change its ways, without much 
Vanguard to Fidelity after Fidelity stopped opposing a then-proposed Pennsylvania an-
titakeover law that Armstrong supported). 
170 See William Baue, Biting the Hand That Feeds:  Mutual Fund Ties to Corporate Clients 
Can Affect Proxy Voting, SOCIALFUNDS.COM, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.socialfunds.com/ 
news/article.cgi/article1659.html (quoting a letter from Bogle to the SEC, but also 
noting that a Fidelity spokesperson disclaimed any link between voting and clients). 
171 Jennifer Levitz, Do Mutual Funds Back CEO Pay?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at 
C1. 
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follow-up if management is not amenable.  Despite this passive ten-
dency, by capitalizing on their economies of scale, mutual funds have 
developed general policies that have led them to support some gov-
ernance proposals brought by other shareholders, withhold votes 
from some board nominees, and oppose some governance proposals 
made by the board. 
B.  Public Pension Funds and Monitoring 
Like mutual funds, public pension funds enjoy significant econo-
mies of scale.  The average member of the Council of Institutional In-
vestors, an organization of large public pension funds as well as union 
and corporate pension funds, has assets exceeding $23 billion.172  The 
concerns about the ability of public pension funds to act as effective 
corporate monitors differ from those related to mutual funds.  Public 
pension funds must make quarterly disclosures of their public equity 
securities holdings.173  But, unlike mutual funds, public pension funds 
are not subject to specific diversification requirements174 or regulatory 
constraints on performance fees, face predictable liquidity require-
ments, and have no business ties with portfolio companies that would 
be jeopardized by activism. 
The problem for public pension funds, rather, is that they are po-
litical entities and, thus, subject to political constraints and conflicts of 
interest.  The makeup of their boards of trustees is governed by state 
law and differs from fund to fund.  Generally, these boards consist of 
some combination of gubernatorial appointees, elected politicians 
who serve ex officio, and officials elected by fund beneficiaries.175  For 
example, the trustees of CalPERS, the nation’s largest public fund, in-
clude six members elected by beneficiaries, three political appointees, 
and four members who serve ex officio.176  The New York State Com-
mon Retirement Fund, the second largest public fund, has the State 
172 See Council of Institutional Investors, About the Council, http://www.cii.org/ 
about (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (noting that it has “130 public, labor, and corporate 
pension funds with assets exceeding $3 trillion”). 
173 For a discussion of disclosure requirements for institutional investors, see infra 
Part II.C.2. 
174 Public pension funds are subject to a prudent person standard for diversifica-
tion.  Romano, supra note 122, at 800.  But given a fund’s size, this would often not be 
an effective constraint on its ability to take large positions in portfolio companies. 
175 Id. at 823-25 & tbl.2. 
176 CalPERS, Structure & Responsibilities (May 12, 2005),  http://www.calpers.ca.gov/ 
index.jsp?bc=/about/organization/board/structure-responsibilities.xml. 
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Comptroller, a state-wide elected official, as its sole trustee.177  As 
should be evident, public pension fund trustees lack significant finan-
cial incentives to maximize fund performance. 
To be sure, public pension funds can hire professional managers 
compensated by performance-based fees.178  The funds, however, are 
subject to political constraints in setting the size of these fees.  As offi-
cials who are, as some commentators have noted, “accountable for 
their decisions to politicians or the press,”179 state pension officials 
avoid calling negative publicity to their activities.  The adverse public-
ity generated by the pay packages of the managers of Harvard Univer-
sity’s endowment provides some indication of the nature of these con-
straints.  Though Jack Meyer, Harvard’s top investment manager, 
“produced stellar investment results,” alumni complained that the pay 
of Meyer and of some of his top managers was inappropriately high.180  
Meyer and some of his employees ultimately left Harvard to start a 
hedge fund.181  By private sector standards, however—and certainly by 
hedge fund standards182—Meyer’s pay package ($7 million in 2004) 
and those of his top two managers ($35 million each in 2003 and $25 
million each in 2004)183 were laughably small, considering that Har-
vard’s endowment of $22 billion would have been more than $12 bil-
lion smaller had Meyer earned median returns.184  Consistent with the 
tendency illustrated by the Harvard endowment example, empirical 
evidence has shown that the compensation of public pension fund 
administrators is less frequently based on performance—and is less 
177 N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., About Us, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/ 
retire/about_us (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
178 CalPERS pays performance-based fees to some of its external managers.  See Cal-
PERS, External Manager Fees Report, in ANNUAL INVESTMENT REPORT, YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 
2005, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/invest/investmentreport-2005/investment_operations/ 
external-manager-fees.asp. 
179 Kevin J. Murphy & Karen Van Nuys, Governance, Behavior, and Performance 
of State and Corporate Pension Funds 14 (Sept. 1994) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http:// http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~kjmurphy/Pensions.pdf. 
180 Charles Stein, Harvard’s High-Paid Star Investor Leaving, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 
2005, at A1. 
181 Peter Grant & Rebecca Buckman, Fatter Pay Lures University Endowment Chiefs, 
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2006, at C1. 
182 For a discussion of hedge fund manager compensation, see infra Part II.C.3. 
183 Stein, supra note 180. 
184 Charles Stein, Harvard’s $12 Billion Man, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2004, at D1.  
See generally Grant & Buckman, supra note 181 (discussing Meyer’s departure from Har-
vard and the problem of low endowment compensation compared to the private sec-
tor). 
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performance sensitive when it is—than that of private-plan administra-
tors.185
Given the potential pitfalls of high pay packages, a politically safer 
course for pension fund boards that are willing to pay steep perform-
ance-based fees would be to entrust funds to an outside entity rather 
than to hire in-house managers.  This, of course, is exactly what public 
pension funds do when they manage the indexed portion of their 
portfolio in-house and invest some of their other assets in private eq-
uity funds, venture capital funds, and hedge funds.186
Political constraints can also inhibit public pension funds from 
pursuing some of the more aggressive activist strategies employed by 
hedge funds.  It is one thing for public pension funds to sponsor 
shareholder resolutions demanding greater board accountability, to 
act as lead plaintiffs in securities lawsuits, or even to demand govern-
ance changes in underperforming companies.  It is quite another for 
them to tell a CEO how to run her business—by opposing major stra-
tegic acquisitions, demanding asset spin-offs, or recommending a dif-
ferent business strategy—and then threaten a proxy contest if man-
agement fails to cooperate.  Public pension funds simply lack the 
legitimacy to push beyond relatively uncontroversial “motherhood 
and apple pie” issues.  Unlike CEOs or hedge fund managers, these 
funds do not have to go out to the market to compete for investment 
capital; their managers have little financial stake in their success; they 
are not subject to market penalties for failure; they are run by politi-
cians, bureaucrats, and union representatives; and as political entities, 
they are subject to political pressure not to overstep their bounds. 
Compounding these political constraints are political conflicts of 
interest.  Pension fund trustees who are gubernatorial appointees or 
elected politicians may be tempted to pursue political ends, rather 
than work to maximize investment returns.  In her 1993 article on 
pension fund activism, Roberta Romano details several instances of 
pension fund trustees pursuing political goals rather than profits.  In 
1992, for example, the Illinois state treasurer and trustee of the state 
185 See Tracie Woidtke, Agents Watching Agents?:  Evidence from Pension Fund Owner-
ship and Firm Value, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 104 (2002) (providing a statistical comparison 
of compensation structure for private and public pension fund administration). 
186 See, e.g., Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Taps Blackstone Alternative Asset 
Management as Advisor to $1 Billion Hedge Fund Program (May 15, 2001), available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2001/may/tapsblackstone.xml 
(noting that the CalPERS board agreed to establish a $1 billion hedge fund program 
in October 2000). 
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pension fund threatened not to make future investments in a lever-
aged buyout fund unless the fund’s operator preserved jobs in an Illi-
nois plant it was selling to its employees.187  The same year, “Elizabeth 
Holzman, New York City comptroller and a trustee for the city’s pen-
sion funds, publicized her active approach to corporate governance” 
in her campaign for the Democratic nomination for New York’s sen-
ate seat.188  As related by Romano, both the New York and the Califor-
nia state pension funds have come under political pressure to tone 
down (and indeed did tone down) their governance activities.189  
More recently, Alan Hevesi, the very active New York State Comptrol-
ler190 and sole trustee of the $115 billion New York State Common Re-
tirement Fund,191 has been criticized both for pursuing political 
goals192 and for having the fund hire law firms that made large contri-
butions to his campaign.193
Trustees elected by fund beneficiaries are usually union represen-
tatives, who also have objectives that may conflict with their fiduciary 
duty to maximize investment returns.194  For example, CalPERS, the 
largest and, traditionally, most active public pension fund, has come 
under increased criticism for the presence of union representatives on 
its board and the pro-union stance it has taken in various labor dis-
187 Romano, supra note 122, at 797 n.6, 807. 
188 Id. at 822. 
189 Id. at 815-20.  For another example of such pressure, see Jayne W. Barnard, In-
stitutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1141 n.39 
(1991) (discussing the political fallout when Wisconsin’s pension fund submitted a 
proposal critical of management to General Motors as it was considering expanding a 
plant in Wisconsin). 
190 See Arden Dale, New York Fund Sues Merck, Citing Vioxx, Stock Drop, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 1, 2004, at B8 (noting that Hevesi is considered an “activist comptroller” and de-
tailing the investor suits he has filed). 
191 New York State Office of the State Comptroller, Pension Investment and Cash 
Management, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 
2007). 
192 See Editorial, Pension Fund Blackmail, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2005, at A10 (arguing 
that Hevesi was using his clout as pension fund trustee to aid John Kerry). 
193 See, e.g., Editorial, Comptrolling Legal Authority, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2005, at A10; 
Karen Donovan, Legal Reform Turns a Steward Into an Activist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2005, 
at C1; Editorial, Hevesi by the Letter, N.Y. SUN, Apr. 12, 2005, at 10; see also Woidtke, supra 
note 185, at 127-28 (concluding that public pension fund activism is motivated more 
by political and social goals than by firm performance). 
194 Pension Fund Blackmail, supra note 192 (“[T]he AFL-CIO and its friends are now 
using pension funds to advance their political agenda.”); see also Michael Schroeder, 
Council of Institutional Investors Is Set To Focus on Morgan Stanley, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 
2005, at A15 (noting that labor representatives have sought trustee positions in order 
to “bolster union power to influence corporate management”). 
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putes.195  When public pension funds do not pursue political or labor 
goals, the relatively low pay and incentives of public pension fund ex-
ecutives raise the specter that their governance activities are designed 
more for self-promotion than to enhance returns.196
The political constraints and conflicts of public pension funds not 
only make the funds less likely to engage in certain kinds of activism, 
but these constraints can also make public funds less effective when 
they do become active.  To the extent that others perceive public pen-
sion fund activism to be politically motivated or as serving the promo-
tional interests of fund executives, they are less likely to support pub-
lic funds when they do become active.  Without such support, 
however, activism is less likely to affect changes in the portfolio com-
panies.  This, again, suggests that public funds will be most effective 
when their activism is perceived to be least affected by political or per-
sonal motives—such as uncontroversial “apple pie” issues—and, thus, 
will be inclined to limit their activism to those issues. 
The actual activities of public pension funds correspond to these 
incentives and constraints.  Consistent with their lack of business rela-
tions with target companies and the political interests of some trus-
tees, public pension fund activism is somewhat more open and con-
frontational than activism by mutual funds:  public funds make more 
shareholder proposals, publish lists of target companies, and apply to 
become lead plaintiffs in securities class actions.  But the choice of 
targets—companies that have been underperforming or have been 
accused of major fraud—and the substance of the activism—such as 
calling for greater board accountability and opposing excessive CEO 
compensation—insulate the fund from political backlash.  Addition-
ally, because they lack the requisite incentives and credibility to do so, 
public funds have steered clear of demanding specific changes in 
195 See Editorial, Calpers and Cronyism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2004, at A18 (discussing 
the political and union ties of CalPERS board members and accusing the board of bas-
ing investment decisions on political goals of labor and the Democratic party); Jim 
Carlton & Jonathan Weil, Ouster Isn’t Expected To Alter Calpers Policy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 
2004, at C3 (noting that CalPERS has been criticized for “meddling in political and 
labor-union issues with little connection to improving shareholder returns”); Jonathan 
Weil & Joann S. Lublin, Gadfly Activism at Calpers Leads to Possible Ouster of President, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2004, at A1 (explaining CalPERS’s controversial actions in inter-
ceding on behalf of the striking employees of a portfolio company). 
196 See Romano, supra note 122, at 822 & n.102 (suggesting that veteran activist 
Dale Hanson, former head of CalPERS, may have been so motivated); Black, Share-
holder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 25, at 599 (“[Public fund managers] may become 
active shareholders partly to generate good publicity for themselves.”). 
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strategy or management, have not engaged in proxy contests, and, so 
far, have not even joined forces with hedge funds in opposing or trig-
gering corporate control transactions. 
C.  Hedge Funds and Monitoring 
1.  Size 
Since hedge funds are largely unregulated, significantly less data 
is available about them than about other institutional investors.  How-
ever, the available evidence suggests that hedge funds enjoy signifi-
cant economies of scale.  According to one estimate, there are ap-
proximately 8000 hedge funds with aggregate assets under 
management of over $1 trillion.197  These figures indicate that the av-
erage hedge fund has assets of about $100 million, while the largest 
hedge funds have assets of over $10 billion.198  Although smaller than 
the comparable figures for mutual funds and pension funds, these 
figures probably understate the effective assets of hedge funds.  
Unlike mutual funds and pension funds, hedge funds regularly use 
leverage and invest in derivatives, enabling them to take positions that 
are much larger than those of mutual funds with similar net assets.  
According to an industry report, 15% of hedge funds use a leverage 
ratio in excess of 2—meaning that the total dollars invested are more 
than twice the total equity—and another 35-55% use leverage at a 
lower ratio.199
2.  Regulatory Constraints 
Hedge funds are not subject to any specific regulatory constraints.  
They must, however, comply with rules applicable to investors gener-
ally.  These constraints include the disclosure requirements under sec-
tion 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act,200 which requires disclo-
sures by persons who own more than 5% of the equity securities of a 
public company, and the short-swing profit rules under section 
197 Hedge Funds and the SEC:  Still Free, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2006, at 68.
198 Institutional Investor Magazine’s Alpha Names Farallon Capital Mgmt the 
World’s Largest Hedge Fund Firm in Their Annual Hedge Fund 100, PR NEWSWIRE, 
May 27, 2005, available at Factiva, Doc. No. PRN0000020050527e15r002ml. 
199 See WILLIAM P. OSTERBERG & JAMES B. THOMSON, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVE-
LAND, THE TRUTH ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS 2 (1999), http://www.clevelandfed.org/ 
Research/commentary/1999/0501.pdf. 
200 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000). 
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16(b),201 which are applicable to officers, directors, and 10% share-
holders of a company.202
In addition, all institutional investment managers—including 
hedge fund managers—are subject to the disclosure requirement of 
section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act.203  Under that provision, 
certain investment managers (including mutual fund, pension fund, 
and hedge fund managers) must make disclosures about their hold-
ings on a quarterly basis.  However, the disclosure requirements under 
section 13(f) differ from those applicable to mutual funds in two im-
portant respects.  First, and most significantly, only holdings of regis-
tered equity securities—so-called “13(f) securities”—need to be dis-
closed.  These 13(f) securities include traded shares and options listed 
on an exchange.  Importantly, however, holdings of other options and 
derivatives need not be disclosed in one’s 13(f) filings.  As a result, 
hedge funds can use derivatives to accumulate large economic posi-
tions in portfolio companies without disclosure, unless they become 
subject to the disclosure requirements under section 13(d).  In addi-
tion, no disclosures at all must be made if one’s holdings of 13(f) se-
curities are less than $100 million.  Thus, small and even medium-
sized hedge funds can avoid making any disclosures as long as a suffi-
ciently large percentage of their holdings are in debt securities or in 
nonlisted equity derivatives. 
Hedge funds also have a greater ability to invest in illiquid assets 
than do mutual funds.  While mutual funds are required to redeem 
shares on short notice, and SEC guidelines limit the percentage of as-
sets that mutual funds can hold in illiquid investments, hedge funds 
are not subject to any similar regulatory requirements.  Contractually, 
hedge fund investors have more limited withdrawal rights than mutual 
fund investors.  Traditionally, hedge fund investors could make with-
drawals only after an initial lock-up period of six months.  More re-
cently, some hedge funds have extended the initial lock-up period to 
two years or longer.204  Once the initial lock-up period has expired, 
201 § 16(b). 
202 § 16(a). 
203 § 13(f). 
204 See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Ex-Chairman of S.E.C. Set To Start Hedge Fund, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at C1 (reporting that investors in a new hedge fund only can re-
deem initial funds after two years, and thereafter only annually); Gregory Zuckerman 
& Ian McDonald, Hedge Funds Avoid SEC Registration Rule, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2005, at 
C1 (noting that several hedge funds have adopted a two-year lock-up period, in part to 
avoid SEC registration requirements).  The increased lock-up may contribute to hedge 
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further restrictions apply.  In particular, hedge funds usually require 
advance notice for withdrawals and sometimes permit withdrawals 
only at specific points in time, while also imposing limits on the 
amounts an investor can withdraw at any point.205  In addition, hedge 
funds may refuse a withdrawal request if the withdrawal would be 
harmful to other investors in the fund or may “pay” a requested with-
drawal “in-kind,” rather than in cash.206  These provisions combine to 
make hedge funds much less sensitive than mutual funds to sudden 
liquidity shocks.207
3.  Incentives To Monitor 
As discussed above, traditional institutional investors suffer from 
impaired incentives to monitor portfolio companies.  The incentives 
for hedge funds to monitor portfolio companies differ in several im-
portant respects from those of traditional institutions.  First, hedge 
fund managers are highly incentivized to maximize the returns to 
fund investors.  The standard hedge fund charges a base fee equal to 
1-2% of the assets under management and a significant incentive fee, 
typically 20% of the profits earned.208  This fee structure gives hedge 
fund managers a very significant stake in the financial success of the 
fund’s investments.  These stakes are even higher when, as is fre-
quently the case, a hedge fund manager has invested a significant por-
tion of her personal wealth in the hedge fund.209
fund activism.  Rachel McTague, Two-Year Lock-Up for Hedge Funds Seen as Promoting Ac-
tivist Strategies, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Mar. 29, 2006, available at LEXIS. 
205 See, e.g., Henny Sender, Citadel Pulls Up Its Withdrawal Bridge, As Hedge Funds Aim 
To Block the Exits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2006, at C1 (noting that Citadel charged a pen-
alty on an investor that wanted to withdraw more than 3% of its money). 
206 Telephone Interview with Nathan Fischel, Managing Member, DAFNA Capital 
Management LLC, in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 2, 2006). 
207 Hedge funds also have a greater ability to take on debt than mutual funds.  
Under the Investment Company Act, mutual funds are required to have a three-to-one 
asset-to-debt ratio.  Investment Company Act of 1940 § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) 
(2000).  As most mutual funds have no debt to speak of, this regulatory constraint is 
unlikely to be binding.  Hedge funds are not similarly limited and, by all accounts, of-
ten are far more leveraged. 
208 See Interview with Anonymous Hedge Fund Manager (Jan. 30, 2006).  This fee 
is usually structured to incorporate a high-water mark, but not a claw back.  That is, if a 
fund produces losses, these losses have to be made up before any incentive fee is pay-
able (this is the high-water mark requirement), but if a fund makes profits and earns 
an incentive fee, the fee does not have to be returned if the fund suffers subsequent 
losses (hence, no claw back). 
209 E-mail from David Haarmeyer to Marcel Kahan, George T. Lowy Professor of 
Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Apr. 4, 2006) (on file with authors). 
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Secondly, many hedge funds strive to achieve high absolute re-
turns, rather than returns relative to a benchmark.210  In particular, 
the industry standard 20% incentive fee is usually based on a fund’s 
absolute performance.  And while a few funds use a hurdle rate before 
the incentive fee is payable, this hurdle rate is generally a rate based 
on the yield of debt securities, not based on the performance of a 
market index or an index of hedge funds with similar investment ob-
jectives. 
Thus, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds benefit directly and sub-
stantially from achieving high absolute returns.  For successful man-
agers, the resulting profits can be extraordinarily high.  The average 
take-home pay for the top twenty-five hedge fund managers in 2003 
was $207 million, and the lowest paid manager in that group still 
earned a respectable $65 million.211  These figures increased in 2004, 
when the average manager earned $251 million and the lowest paid 
manager received $100 million.212
Of course, hedge fund managers, like mutual fund managers, also 
care about retaining existing investors and attracting new ones 
through their performance.  But even to the extent that hedge fund 
performance is, for this purpose, assessed relative to a benchmark or 
to other hedge funds with comparable strategies, their incentives are 
diluted to a lesser extent than those of mutual funds.  This is because 
hedge fund portfolios resemble the relevant index much less than 
those of mutual funds.  Reliable data on hedge fund holdings are not 
available since hedge funds need only disclose their holdings in equity 
securities and listed options, and not any other derivatives.  We are 
thus unable to calculate the percentage of dilution in hedge fund in-
centives in the manner we calculated Magellan’s dilution in incen-
tives.213  But the hedge fund managers we talked to confirmed that 
hedge fund investments are definitely much more eclectic and less 
correlated with a market index, or with investments of another hedge 
fund with a similar investment style, than those of mutual funds.214  As 
210 Fin. Servs. Auth., Hedge Funds:  A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement 10 
(Fin. Servs. Auth. Discussion Paper 05/4, 2005), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
pubs/discussion/dp05_04.pdf. 
211 Stephen Taub, The Bucks Stop Here, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 2004, at 47, 
47. 
212 Stephen Taub, Alpha’s Top 25, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR’S ALPHA, May-June 
2005, at 15, 15. 
213 See supra Table 1. 
214 Interview with Anonymous Hedge Fund Manager, supra note 208. 
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one manager put it:  eclecticism “is what we are selling.”215  As a result, 
hedge funds need not worry much about competitor funds free riding 
on their governance activism and getting higher returns with lower 
costs. 
Even if the activism of one hedge fund boosts the returns of activ-
ist hedge funds generally, the result may not be all that bad.  Investors 
use returns of funds with a certain investment style to determine the 
amount of money they invest in this sector of funds.  If activism by one 
hedge fund boosts the returns of activist hedge funds generally, more 
money will flow into this sector, thereby benefiting all activist funds.216
4.  Conflicts of Interest 
Hedge funds suffer from fewer conflicts of interest between fund 
managers and fund investors than traditional institutional investors.  
First, most hedge funds are independent investment vehicles and are 
not affiliated with any other institution.  Of the twenty largest hedge 
funds in 2004, only one was affiliated with another financial institu-
tion, such as a bank or insurance company.217  By contrast, as reported 
above, of the twenty largest mutual fund complexes in 2003, nine were 
so affiliated.218  Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that even 
hedge funds that are affiliated with other financial institutions do not 
shy away from taking actions that are antagonistic to investment bank-
ing clients of their affiliates.  Recently, for example, the Highbridge 
Fund, majority-owned by J.P. Morgan, accumulated an over 25% stake 
in convertible bonds of Saks Inc. and then sent a “notice of default” 
when Saks breached a covenant by failing to file financial statements 
with the SEC—even though Saks has an investment banking relation-
ship with J.P. Morgan.219  Indeed, some concern recently has been ex-
215 Id.  Hedge funds specializing in merger arbitrage may be an exception in this 
regard, since their investments are highly correlated with those of other hedge funds 
specializing in merger arbitrage. 
216 Moreover, investors in hedge funds tend to be highly sophisticated.  As a result, 
they may tend to use more complex evaluation criteria and channel their investment 
to the funds that took the lead in activism, and not those that were free riders. 
217  Interview with Anonymous Hedge Fund Manager, supra note 208. 
218 Supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
219 Mike Esterl & Henny Sender, Highbridge Fund Sent Default Note to Retailer Saks, 
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005 at C5 (suggesting that Highbridge had bet on Saks stock de-
clining by taking a short position). 
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pressed that investment banks sacrifice the interests of other clients in 
order to cultivate and retain lucrative hedge fund business.220
In addition, unlike mutual funds, hedge funds do not manage 
companies’ defined-contribution plans.  Accordingly, they do not 
have to be concerned that activism will result in a loss of fund man-
agement business.  In sum, hedge funds are, to a much greater extent 
than mutual funds, free from the most significant potential sources of 
conflicts of interest.221
To be sure, hedge funds may still face some conflicts of interest to 
the extent that they want to attract contributions by defined-benefit 
corporate pension funds that are run by management-appointed trus-
tees.  Mutual funds, of course, would also face similar conflicts.  But 
we believe that, at least for hedge funds, these conflicts tend to be mi-
nor.  First, hedge funds may not be all that interested in capital from 
private pension funds.  If private pension funds, together with public 
pension funds, account for more than 25% of the capital of a hedge 
fund, the hedge fund becomes subject to regulations under  
ERISA222—a fate unattractive to a sector that is otherwise largely un-
regulated.  More importantly, however, we do not think that corporate 
pension funds have been, or will become, a substantial source of di-
rect funds for hedge funds.  Historically, corporate pension funds 
have not been significant contributors to hedge funds.  Rather, hedge 
funds have obtained most of their capital from wealthy individuals and 
220 See, e.g., Hedge Funds and Capital Markets:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities 
and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (May 
16, 2006) (statement of Susan Ferris Wyderko, Director, Office of Investor Education 
and Assistance, SEC) available at 2006 WLNR 8468099 (discussing potential dangers of 
such “side-by-side” management); see also Michael Forman, FSA Bloodhounds Pursue 
Hedge Funds, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, May 16, 2005, at 11 (announcing an FSA review of 
the relationships between hedge funds and large investment banks in the U.K.). 
221 Cf. Mara Der Hovanesian & Nanette Byrnes, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Feb. 20, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/ 
content/06_08/b3972103.htm (noting that hedge funds, unlike mutual funds, are not 
trying to sell money management services to companies). 
222 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f) (2006); see also Client Publication, Shearman & Ster-
ling LLP, Hedge Fund Compliance with ERISA 25% Limit (Sept. 2004), available at  
http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/0527637a-386d-4edd-b83b-b4babc648872/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a8795ffd-7839-4515-8787-d058684f9ae2/eceb_092004.pdf 
(providing a brief overview of the applicability of the 25% limit to hedge funds).  Un-
der the recently passed Pension Protection Act of 2006, investments in hedge funds by 
foreign and governmental plans no longer count towards the 25% limit.  § 611(f), 
Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. 
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institutions such as foundations or university endowments.223  More 
recently, corporate (as well as public) pension funds have started to 
make investments in hedge funds.224  While we lack precise data, we 
do not believe that corporate pension funds are a major source of 
capital for hedge funds at this time.  And, given the declining impor-
tance of corporate defined-benefit plans,225 we are skeptical that they 
ever will become one.  Finally, even to the extent that corporate pen-
sion funds invest in hedge funds, they tend to do so through funds-of-
funds rather than directly.226  Hedge fund managers do not know the 
identity of the investor in a fund-of-funds, and investors in a fund-of-
funds do not always know to which hedge funds their money flows.  
The presence of funds-of-funds thus serves to further insulate hedge 
funds from pressure by corporate pension funds. 
Whatever residual conflicts of interest may remain must be com-
pared to the affirmative incentives to enhance investor returns.  As 
explained, hedge fund management firms and individual managers 
derive substantially greater benefits from increased fund returns than 
do mutual fund management firms and managers.  As a result, any 
conflict of interest is more likely to be resolved in favor of hedge fund 
investors.  On the whole, therefore, we do not believe that conflicts of 
interests are likely to interfere with activism by hedge funds, and, even 
if such interference does occur, it occurs much less than in the case of 
public pension funds and mutual funds. 
223 See, e.g., Jason Singer, Ivy Leave:  Yale Parts Ways with Hedge Fund, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 29, 2006, at C1 (indicating that 25.7% of Yale’s endowment is invested in hedge 
funds). 
224 The Hennessee Group recently estimated that public and private pension 
funds combined account for 9% of the sources of capital to hedge funds.  Hennessee 
Group LLC, Hedge Fund Industry Growth (Jan. 2005), http://www.magnum.com/ 
hedgefunds/articles/2005/050101.pdf. 
225 In 1995, private pension funds held corporate equities of nearly $1.3 trillion, 
amounting to 15% of the total market value of corporate equities.  By 2005, private 
pension funds held corporate equities of approximately $2.4 trillion, amounting to 9% 
of the total market value of corporate equities.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RE-
SERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1995-2005, at 67 
tbl.L118, 82 tbl.L213 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/ 
z1/Current/annuals/a1995-2005.pdf. 
226 Jane B. Kenney et al., The Hedge Fund 100, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR’S ALPHA, 
June 2003, at 40, 40 (“Much of the new pension money enters the market through 
funds of hedge funds.”) 
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5.  Activism and Stakes 
In the end, the incentives for a fund to engage in activism depend 
on its stake in a portfolio company.227  In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that activist hedge funds usually accumulate stakes in portfolio com-
panies in order to engage in activism.  There are numerous examples of 
hedge funds taking stakes whose values depend on firm actions, and 
then taking action to determine the outcome—everything from trying 
to influence strategy and running proxy contests, to instigating litiga-
tion and threatening to vote against mergers. 
In this regard, hedge funds differ markedly from mutual funds 
and public pension funds.  Mutual fund and public pension fund ac-
tivism, if it occurs, tends to be incidental and ex post:  when fund 
management notes that portfolio companies are underperforming, or 
that their governance regime is deficient, they will sometimes become 
active.228  In contrast, hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante:  
hedge fund managers first determine whether a company would bene-
fit from activism, then take a position and become active.  Hedge fund 
activism represents a blurring of the line between risk arbitrage and 
battles over corporate strategy and control. 
This suggests that the differences in activism between hedge funds 
and other institutions may be, at least in part, endogenous.  Because 
(activist) hedge funds pursue activism as a profit-making strategy, they 
take economic positions in portfolio companies that enable them to 
engage in, and make profits from, activism.  In contrast, traditional 
institutions do not pursue activism as a profit-making strategy; thus 
they do not take positions for this purpose and, accordingly, engage in 
less activism. 229  Put differently, the difference in activism is, in part, 
due to the fact that hedge funds and traditional institutions pursue 
different profit strategies. 
227 In addition, hedge funds may structure their portfolios so that they profit from 
activism in various ways.  As discussed below, for example, it is likely that Highfields 
stood to profit from a defeat of the MONY-AXA merger both through its holdings of 
MONY shares and through its holdings of ORANs.  See infra Part III.A.2.  On the plus 
side, this can allow hedge funds to increase their returns from successful activism, 
thereby overcoming rational apathy or free riding. 
228 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 119, at 231-32 (describing the criteria for target se-
lection used by CalPERS). 
229 See Ubben & Haarmeyer, supra note 160, at 60 (noting that traditional money 
managers own small positions in many companies and have poor performance incen-
tives, whereas activist investors invest in a small number of companies and have power-
ful incentives). 
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Viewed from this perspective, the relevant question becomes why 
(some) hedge funds pursue activism as a strategy, while (most) tradi-
tional institutions do not.  The answer to this question may lie, in part, 
in the fact that traditional institutions face regulatory barriers, politi-
cal constraints, and conflicts of interest that make activism less profit-
able for them than it is for hedge funds. 
But the difference in strategies may also be due to the fact that 
mutual funds view and market themselves as vehicles for diversifica-
tion, which enables their investors to gain broad exposure to markets 
at low costs.  To be a successful activist, it is probably helpful for a 
fund to engage in activism as a principal strategy—activism presuma-
bly entails learning, with funds that have done more of it becoming 
better at it, and funds with an activist reputation more easily attracting 
support from other investors and inducing management changes.  An 
activist strategy, however, does not mesh well with a diversification ob-
jective, because strategic activism is relatively expensive and requires a 
fund to take comparatively large positions in relatively few companies.  
Hedge funds, in contrast, do not see themselves as vehicles for diversi-
fication; they engage in targeted hedges, rather than diversification, 
to eliminate unwanted risk.230  More narrowly tailored strategies—such 
as activism—are thus more appropriate for hedge funds than for mu-
tual funds.231
III.  PROBLEMS GENERATED BY HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM:   
CONFLICTS AND STRESS FRACTURES 
Although hedge funds hold great promise as active shareholders, 
their intense involvement in corporate governance and control also 
230 Perhaps more importantly, hedge funds have less of a need to diversify because 
investors in hedge funds, unlike many investors in mutual funds, are already substan-
tially diversified through their other holdings.  Put differently, hedge fund investors 
have a greater tolerance for risk generated by their hedge fund investment than mu-
tual fund investors have with respect to their mutual fund investment. 
231 Even nonactivist hedge funds tend to pursue narrowly tailored investment strategies 
such as merger arbitrage and convertible bond arbitrage.  Of course, some “multistrategy” 
hedge funds pursue broader (or a combination of narrower) strategies, and some mutual 
funds—such as sector funds—offer lesser diversification benefits.  Indeed, some mutual 
funds, such as Mutual Beacon Fund, are even relatively activist.  FRANKLIN TEMPLETON IN-
VESTMENTS, A GUIDE TO INVESTMENT STYLE 9 (2006), http://www.profinvest.ca/clients/ 
Feature_Articles/Investment_Styles_-_Franklin_Templeton.pdf (describing the in-
vestment strategies used by the Mutual Series of funds, including “activist” investments 
in distressed securities).  On the whole, however, the mutual fund sector is dominated 
by funds with broadly diversified portfolios, while the hedge fund sector is character-
ized by funds with narrowly tailored strategies. 
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raises some concerns.  Hedge funds are set up to make money for 
their investors without regard to whether the strategies they follow 
benefit shareholders generally.  For example, a hedge fund that owns 
shares in Company A may try to use that position to increase the value 
of another position, say in Company B, rather than to maximize the 
share price of Company A.  Indeed, because hedge funds frequently 
engage in hedges and other sophisticated trading and arbitrage 
strategies, such conflicts of interest are likely to arise more frequently 
for hedge funds than for other institutional investors.  We examine 
these “hedging-related conflicts” in Section A. 
In addition to these direct conflicts, we also address a secondary 
problem related to hedge fund activism.  Hedge funds combine high-
powered incentives with great sophistication and access to vast pools 
of capital.  Together, these can put great stress on the existing gov-
ernance system.  We examine some of these potential “stress fractures” 
in Section B. 
We conclude this Part by commenting in Section C on the ab-
sence, so far, of a third set of problems:  managers buying off activist 
hedge funds through the payment of greenmail or similar devices.  
We leave the most common, and potentially most serious, criticism 
leveled against hedge funds—that they, due to their short-term trad-
ing horizons, aggravate an already serious problem of “short-termism” 
in the executive suite—to be analyzed in Part IV. 
In assessing the need for a regulatory response to these problems, 
there are several considerations.  First, to what extent does the exist-
ing regulatory structure adequately address the concerns?  Here, we 
consider whether the problems are of a familiar type, and whether the 
increased pressure on the system imposed by hedge funds overwhelms 
existing tools.  When a problem is a standard corporate law problem, 
we presume that the existing regulatory structure is adequate, unless 
some specific aspect of hedge fund involvement changes the analysis.  
If, on the other hand, the problem is of a new type, new tools may be 
required. 
If one concludes that the current structure is inadequate, one 
then needs to consider which of the various tools available is most ap-
propriate.  In this regard, there are three general categories of poten-
tial responses.  One can rely on market forces (e.g., competition 
among hedge funds or reputation), employ self-help (e.g., charter 
amendments or contracts), or resort to regulation. 
While the specific response depends on the precise nature of the 
problem, it is critical to bear in mind that hedge fund activism is not 
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static.  Hedge funds are among the most nimble market actors, with a 
track record of coming up with new strategies, some of which are de-
signed to exploit imperfections in the very responses developed to the 
old strategies.  Moreover, hedge funds are not only clever, but quick.  
Therefore, in choosing a mode of response, speed and flexibility are 
very important.  This suggests that market forces and self-help are bet-
ter designed to deal with these problems than regulation.  The reason 
is twofold.  First, private actors generally can react more quickly than 
regulators.  Second, private actors have a greater ability to learn from 
each other to devise a proper response. 
As we will see, many of the problems discussed in this Part are fa-
miliar and classic corporate law problems.  Despite the increased pres-
sure applied by hedge funds, our general view is that the traditional 
solutions (perhaps with increased enforcement), supplemented by 
market responses and, possibly, some additional disclosure require-
ments, should suffice.  We are not indifferent to the possibility of ille-
gal or improper behavior; rather, our view is that the current regula-
tory structure can handle it, with minor exceptions. 
A.  The Dark Side:  Hedging-Related Conflicts 
1.  Buying (Control) vs. Selling (Shares) 
As the earlier anecdotes show, hedge funds are sometimes poten-
tial buyers, as opposed to sellers.  When a hedge fund is a potential 
buyer of a company in which it has a stake, its interests clearly diverge 
from those of its fellow shareholders.  The hedge fund wants to buy at 
the lowest possible price, while the other shareholders want to sell at 
the highest possible price.  A hedge fund’s activities may not be so 
much directed at making sure that the target is sold at the highest 
price, but rather at increasing the likelihood that the hedge fund suc-
ceeds in its acquisition attempt. 
This is a very old problem in corporate law that is analyzed under 
the rubric of the duty of loyalty.  While hedge funds’ interests diverge 
from general shareholder interests when they are seeking to buy con-
trol, this conflict is obvious, with management and other shareholders 
aware of it and on guard against it.  Moreover, hedge funds will gen-
erally have no control over the target company they are trying to buy.  
We therefore believe that no special response is necessary. 
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2.  Conflicts in Merger Votes 
A more subtle conflict can arise in control transactions when a 
hedge fund owns other securities, the value of which depends on 
whether the transaction is consummated.  Such conflicts featured 
prominently in the proposed acquisition of MONY (a publicly traded 
life insurance company) by AXA (a large French financial conglom-
erate), where hedge funds both favoring and opposing the deal had 
conflicts of interest.232  Highfields—a hedge fund holding nearly 5% 
of MONY—led the opposition by MONY shareholders, running a full-
page ad in the Wall Street Journal “urging MONY shareholders to reject 
the sale,”233 convincing Institutional Shareholder Services, a proxy ad-
visory firm, to recommend a “no” vote on the deal,234 and establishing 
a website to aid MONY shareholders in exercising their appraisal 
rights.235
But Highfields’s interests were not pure.  In order to finance its 
cash acquisition of MONY, AXA had issued convertible debt securi-
ties—known as “ORANs”—to its shareholders.  These debt securities 
were to convert into AXA shares on completion of the acquisition, but 
could be redeemed at face value plus interest if the acquisition was 
not completed by December 21, 2004.  Given the relative values in-
volved, the ORANs would be significantly more valuable if the AXA-
MONY deal went through.  Highfields held a large short position in 
ORANs, a position that would become more valuable if the merger 
232 See In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 668 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(“[P]ersons who hold long positions in ORANs stand to gain a large profit on that in-
vestment if the MONY/AXA merger is consummated.  Conversely, arbitrageurs who 
sell ORANs short stand to gain if that same merger is not completed.”). 
233 Sara Hansard, MONY Delays Vote as Dissidents’ Effort Gains Steam, INVESTMENT-
NEWS, Feb. 23, 2004, http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 
20040223/SUB/402230718/-1/INIssueAlert04.  Highfields even mailed a letter to 
shareholders urging them to vote “no” on the merger.  Highfields had originally in-
tended to enclose a duplicate of the corporate proxy card so that shareholders, should 
they choose, could easily cast a “no” vote, but MONY succeeded in obtaining an in-
junction preventing this additional step, despite Highfields’ argument that it was an 
exempt solicitation under Rule 14a-2(b)(1).  MONY Group, Inc. v. Highfields Capital 
Mgmt., L.P., 368 F.3d 138, 141-45 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
234 Hansard, supra note 233 (“ISS said the sale price ‘is outside the boundary of 
reasonableness when compared to precedent transactions coupled with open-market 
opportunities to sell above the offer price.’”). 
235 Highfields Capital Establishes Web Site for MONY Shareholders Exercising Appraisal 
Rights, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 31, 2004, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
PRN0000020040331e03v00bkp (describing the creation of Highfields’s website:  
www.demandfairvalue.com). 
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did not close.236  Other hedge funds favoring the merger, in turn, 
were long on ORANs and apparently purchased MONY stock at a 
premium in order to vote for the merger.237  Eventually, after a post-
ponement of the shareholder meeting (which allowed shareholders 
who bought stock after the previous record date to vote) and much 
litigation, the MONY merger squeaked through, with 53.8% of the 
outstanding shares voting in favor.238
In a world in which more than half of all equities are held by insti-
tutional shareholders, such conflicts are pervasive.  But, while perva-
sive, they are not necessarily bad.  Index funds, for example, will own 
shares on both sides of many mergers between public companies.  In 
such cases, their financial interest is to maximize the value of their 
portfolios.  Thus they should approve a merger if it is value enhanc-
ing, without regard to the magnitude of the premiums paid to share-
holders, even if shareholders of individual firms, qua shareholders, 
might prefer higher premiums.  In contrast to index funds, which 
simply find themselves on both sides, hedge funds potentially exacer-
bate the pervasive conflicts because they choose to invest in both sides 
of a deal and acquire stakes in order to influence the outcome. 
Corporate law has long lived with, and tolerated, conflicts of in-
terest in voting by shareholders.  Hedge funds may be more likely to 
have such conflicts than traditional institutional investors, and may 
even choose to create such conflicts, but the conflicts in the context of 
hedge funds pale compared to the conflicts of controlling sharehold-
ers in freeze-outs, whose votes will usually be outcome-determinative.  
And controlling shareholders are entitled to vote their shares in their 
(conflicted) self-interest, unencumbered by any fiduciary duties to 
minority shareholders.239
236 In re MONY Group, 853 A.2d at 668. 
237 Innisfree Presentation, supra note 27, at slide 11; see also In re MONY Group, 853 
A.2d at 669 (describing the trading activity surrounding the merger).  In a presenta-
tion to the MONY board, CSFB, the Board’s independent financial advisor, “noted 
that as of the Board meeting, anyone long ORANs would receive an approximate 46% 
profit if the merger was consummated, compared to a 2.4% profit if it was not.” Id. at 
671 n.29. 
238 Floyd Norris, Holders of MONY Approve $1.5 Billion Sale to AXA, N.Y. TIMES, May 
19, 2004, at C4.  The article also notes that  “[e]ssential to approval may have been a 
block of 8.7 percent of the shares owned by Deutsche Bank,” which was not disclosed 
until shortly before the vote.  Id. 
239 See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987)  (“Clearly, a 
stockholder is under no duty to sell its holdings in a corporation, even if it is a majority 
shareholder, merely because the sale would profit the minority.”). 
  
2007] HEDGE FUNDS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1075 
 
Therefore, we see little need to impose stricter duties on hedge 
funds, or on voting conflicts more generally,240 for several reasons:  ab-
sent empty voting, the effect of conflicted votes is self-limiting;241 con-
flicted funds are often on both sides of the contested issue and their 
votes thus cancel each other out;242 the market is often aware of, and 
can respond to, these conflicts; all diversified shareholders—including 
all institutional investors—will often find themselves with similar con-
flicts; and the board of directors, which does have fiduciary duties, can 
take measures to counteract any dangers. 
3.  Empty Voting 
A particularly extreme form of a hedging-related conflict arose in 
the proposed Mylan-King merger.  In July 2004, Mylan Laboratories 
entered into a merger agreement with King Pharmaceuticals, 
whereby, subject to shareholder approval, Mylan would acquire King 
in exchange for Mylan shares.  Perry, a hedge fund, was a large share-
holder in King, with approximately seven million shares, and sup-
ported the merger.  While the deal was seen as favorable to King, the 
market reaction to the merger for Mylan was negative, and some large 
shareholders of Mylan, including Carl Icahn, threatened to vote 
against it.  As a result, approval of the merger by Mylan shareholders 
was in doubt.243
Perry then acquired 9.9% of Mylan’s shares.  At the same time, 
Perry apparently entered into “equity swaps” with Bear Stearns and 
Goldman Sachs that fully hedged its economic exposure to Mylan’s 
share price.  As a result, Perry acquired shares—and votes—in Mylan, 
which, because it had no economic stake in Mylan, it could vote 
purely on the basis of its interest as a King shareholder—thus in favor 
of the merger.244  Indeed, this presumably was Perry’s purpose. 
240 We suspect that a more common occurrence is that hedge funds have eco-
nomic interests that are disproportionate to their voting interest due to options or 
other derivatives that have a value that correlates with the stock price, but carry no vot-
ing rights. 
241 As long as the economic interest of a hedge fund corresponds at least to its vot-
ing rights, the hedge fund will suffer proportionally with other shareholders from any 
value decline. 
242 See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing conflicts in the Mylan-King merger vote). 
243 Robert Steyer, New Player Joins Mylan-King Fray, THESTREET.COM, Nov. 29, 2004, 
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/robertsteyer/10196467.html. 
244 Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying:  Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 828-29 (2006).  The issues relating to 
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The divergence between the interests of Perry and those of other 
Mylan shareholders is evident.  If the merger was good for King but 
bad for Mylan, as many Mylan shareholders apparently felt, Perry 
would still vote its sizeable position in Mylan in favor of the merger 
and could help push it through.  As it happened, King had to restate 
its earnings, which caused Mylan management to terminate the 
merger agreement.  The success and legal validity of Perry’s strategy 
thus were not tested.245
“Empty voting,” as this is called, is an example of an old prob-
lem—conflicts of interests created by exploiting the separation of le-
gal and beneficial ownership—aggravated by modern financial inno-
vation.  Perry took advantage of modern financial instruments to 
acquire votes.  While Perry’s actions functionally appear to be a form 
of “vote buying,” legally they do not seem to fall within the existing 
jurisprudential framework.  Indeed, as Hu and Black explain, the ex-
isting regulatory structure does not prohibit it.246  If empty voting 
turns out to be a significant problem—and it is not clear that it will—
new measures will be required, either through regulation or by com-
mon law decision making. 
That said, how exactly the law should be changed, if it should at 
all, is a highly complex question.  The complexity has several sources:  
multiple mechanisms can generate empty votes; current legal rules do 
not treat these mechanisms equivalently; other problems related to 
compilation of broker votes interact with the concerns raised by empty 
voting; and, at present, neither the market, nor companies, nor regu-
empty voting are extensively discussed in Hu & Black, supra, at 828-35; Shaun Martin & 
Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 779-80.
245 Other, more traditional conflicts of interest in voting were also present.  Icahn 
had a stake of about 10% in Mylan, both in terms of economic exposure and in terms 
of voting rights.  But Icahn also had shorted 5.3 million shares of King stock.  See Icahn 
Wins as Mylan, King Deal Dies; Stewart Leaves “Big House” for House Arrest, FORBES.COM, 
Mar. 4, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/04/cx_gl_0304faceweek_print.html 
(explaining Icahn’s position in the failed merger).  Icahn could thus have an eco-
nomic incentive to oppose the merger, even if the merger were in the interest of My-
lan, as long as the market thought that the merger would be significantly more benefi-
cial to King.  In that event, Icahn would gain more from a defeat of the merger 
through his short position in King than he would lose on account of his long position 
in Mylan.  Suppose Icahn shorted the King shares at $30 per share, that the shares 
would go up to $40 per share if the merger were completed, but down to $20 per share 
if the merger failed.  Icahn would then profit from defeating the merger if his profits 
from shorting were greater than the increase in the value of his Mylan stake from 
completing the merger. 
246 Hu & Black, supra note 244, at 861-63. 
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lators have the information necessary to determine the presence and 
extent of empty voting schemes. 
The development of a proper response is further complicated by 
the fact that companies and investors have an interest in determining 
the outcome of a vote speedily.  Thus, any more intrusive legal regime 
that involves protracted litigation generates special problems in the 
context of voting rules.  Moreover, it is unclear to what extent market 
responses (such as the increasing costliness of hedging strategies 
around critical votes) temper empty voting.  For now, we agree with 
Henry Hu and Bernie Black that not enough is known about the ex-
tent of empty voting to prescribe anything more than an increase in 
disclosure of schemes generating empty votes.247
B.  Stress Fractures 
With billions of dollars available, and super-high-powered incen-
tive compensation structures, hedge funds put stress on the existing 
governance structures.  In doing so, they highlight and exacerbate ex-
isting structural weaknesses, albeit not necessarily in a manner that 
generates a conflict of interest with other shareholders.  In this Sec-
tion, we address two such potential weaknesses:  undisclosed con-
certed action and overvoting. 
1.  Undisclosed Concerted Action 
In many of the battles between managers and hedge funds de-
scribed earlier, the shareholder base of companies can change almost 
overnight, with hedge funds sometimes ending up with more than 
50% of the shares.  Managers and their counsel have speculated that 
hedge funds act in concert, both in the acquisition of their shares and 
in the subsequent pressuring of management, without filing the re-
quired disclosure statements248 under section 13(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act.249  Indeed, say some, there is a pervasive problem of 
SEC underenforcement of section 13(d). 
247 See id., supra note 244, at 864-86 (advocating disclosure as a means to curb 
empty voting because the information disclosed would expose a need for empty voting 
reform). 
248 See Be Prepared for Attacks by Hedge Funds, supra note 20 (noting the ten-
dency of activist hedge funds “to execute purchases so as to avoid detection”). 
249 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000). 
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We do not know whether this is true or not.  If there is, in fact, a 
problem of underreporting, it presents an interesting parallel to the 
events of the 1980s.  When hostile tender offers first assumed promi-
nence, management complained that hostile bidders and their allies 
operated behind the scenes to the disadvantage of shareholders and 
companies.  Now one hears complaints that it is hedge funds (some 
run by the same raiders about whom managers complained in the 
1980s) that are operating behind the scenes. 
An important difference exists, however, between nondisclosure 
by raiders in the 1980s and any nondisclosure by activist hedge funds 
today.  The acquisition of a 5% stake by a raider was highly material, 
market-moving information.  By delaying a 13(d) filing, raiders and 
their allies could acquire additional shares at a substantially lower 
price.  By contrast, hedge fund activism has much less of an immedi-
ate market impact.  Moreover, hedge fund corporate governance ac-
tivities are usually conducted publicly, with hedge funds issuing press 
releases long before they reach the 5% filing threshold under section 
13(d).250  Finally, hedge funds (unlike most raiders) must disclose 
their equity holdings quarterly under Section 13(f).251  Thus, while 
hedge funds, like all other investors, ought to comply with 13(d), one 
wonders what all the fuss about a failure to disclose is about. 
To be sure, a 13(d) filing can yield information that would other-
wise not become public.  Specifically, a 13(d) filing could reveal the 
presence of a conflict of interest, such as an empty voting scheme.  
Section 13(d) requires the disclosure of any contracts and other ar-
rangements in which hedge funds dispose of their economic inter-
ests.252  Indeed, it was this 13(d) requirement that forced Perry to re-
veal its hedging positions in the Mylan-King battle.  Where such 
conflicts exist, they would have to be disclosed in a 13(d) filing.  A 
failure to make the filing constitutes a serious problem, but it does 
not appear that such conflicts are common. 
In addition, most poison pills incorporate the 13(d) concept of a 
group into the pill trigger.  Thus, it may sometimes be the case that an 
undisclosed formation of a “group” would trigger the pill—to the se-
rious harm of the participating hedge funds and, one assumes, to the 
250 See, e.g., Yuan & Rhoads, supra note 46 (detailing, in a front page article, Carl 
Icahn’s purchase of a 1.39% stake in Motorola). 
251 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2000). 
252 § 13(d)(1)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(E) (2000).  But section 13(d) does not 
have a per se requirement to disclose conflicts of interest. 
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delight of management and their lawyers.253  In that case, however, 
management is in a good position to respond:  it can argue that the 
hedge funds have formed a group, declare the pill triggered, dilute 
down the members of the alleged group, and wait to be sued.  Given 
the incentives for management to pursue such cases, this does not 
seem to be an area to which the SEC need devote its limited enforce-
ment resources. 
Thus, the key issue is not the SEC’s failure to bring enforcement 
actions, but the vagueness of the concept of “group” underlying sec-
tion 13(d) and the poison pill.  Rule 13d-5 provides that “[w]hen two 
or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, 
holding, voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer, the group 
formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial owner-
ship.”254  Thus, concerted conduct—but not parallel action—will trig-
ger section 13(d)’s reporting obligations.  The fact that a variety of 
hedge funds crowd into the shares of a company at the same time 
does not per se establish the formation of a group, any more than the 
mere fact that competing manufacturers raise their prices at the same 
time establishes a price-fixing agreement in violation of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.255  Proving that parallel conduct is concerted action 
is difficult, both in the antitrust and in the 13(d) context. 
In this regard, hedge fund activism may raise a somewhat novel 
problem.  Until recently, the issue of unaffiliated parties acting in par-
allel to influence a public company—and the accompanying eviden-
tiary ambiguity concerning whether a group has been formed—has 
not arisen that often.  Rather than bring more enforcement actions, 
the SEC may want to provide regulatory clarification on the question 
of group formation. 
2.  Overvoting 
The current voting technology is seriously flawed.  Some argue 
that it is so flawed that in any reasonably close corporate vote—the 
253 See Phyllis Plitch, Lawyers See No Poison Pill To Feed Hedge Fund “Wolf Packs”, 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dow Jones), Dec. 21, 2005, at 4 (discussing the limited ability of 
boards to deploy a pill against hedge funds). 
254 SEC Rule 13d-5(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2006). 
255 Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 
(1954) (“[T]his Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior . . . itself 
constitutes a Sherman Act offense.”). 
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number of which are increasing with more hedge fund involvement—
it would be impossible to prove which side has prevailed. 
Since 1973, to avoid the overwhelming record-keeping problems 
of paper shares, companies have used a book entry system with share 
certificates held by the Depository Trust Company (DTC).  Individual 
brokerage houses each have accounts with DTC in which, under the 
standard arrangements between customers and their brokerage firms, 
holdings of customers are commingled in a single, fungible mass.  
DTC’s records simply indicate that Merrill Lynch, for example, has 
20,000 shares of Firm X, without indicating how many shares specific 
customers of Merrill hold.  As Merrill Lynch’s customers buy and sell, 
Merrill’s net holdings will change and DTC’s records will reflect this, 
but it is Merrill’s responsibility to keep track of its customers’ hold-
ings. 
When it comes time for the shareholders of Firm X to vote, the 
company will typically retain a firm, usually ADP, to handle the distri-
bution of proxy materials, the solicitation of proxies, and the tabula-
tion of the votes.256  ADP receives a list of holdings, sorted by broker-
age house, from DTC and a list of customers’ accounts from the 
participant broker.  It then sends out proxy materials, including proxy 
cards indicating the number of shares in a customer’s account, to all 
who appear on brokers’ lists.  Customers fill out their cards, return 
them to ADP, and the results are then passed on to the firm. 
This system breaks down when there is significant short selling, as 
is often the case when hedge funds are involved.  Consider what hap-
pens when someone “shorts” a stock.257  In a short sale, a brokerage 
house typically arranges for a short seller to acquire shares from a 
broker (sometimes itself) or bank that holds shares (in a fungible 
mass) for its custodial clients, subject to an obligation to return a 
share at some later date.  The short seller then sells the shares to some 
third party, who will take full title and be entirely oblivious to the 
source of the shares. 
Because a short sale involves an actual transfer of shares, it creates 
substantial difficulties in determining who has a right to vote shares, 
256 ADP Investor Communications Services claims a 95% market share.  ADP In-
vestor Commc’n Servs., ADP Investor Communication Services Story, http:// 
ics.adp.com/release11/public_site/about/ics_story.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
257 For an excellent account of the consequences of short selling, see Robert C. 
Apfel et al., Short Sales, Damages, and Class Certification in 10b-5 Actions 7-25 (Univ. Roch-
ester, Bradley Policy Research Ctr., Fin. Research & Policy Working Paper No. FR 01-
19, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=285768. 
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principally because tracing is not possible, and record keeping and 
communication are incomplete.258  Suppose that Merrill has 20,000 
shares of X in its DTC account, while Goldman has 30,000 shares in its 
account.  A hedge fund (HF) “borrows” 5,000 shares from Merrill and, 
to go short, sells them to a customer of Goldman.  Once that sale is 
completed, DTC records will show that Merrill has 15,000 shares of X 
while Goldman has 35,000 shares. 
The problem is now clear:  DTC’s omnibus proxy will transfer the 
right to vote 15,000 shares to Merrill, and will inform ADP of this.  But 
Merrill will give ADP a list of all its customers’ holdings in Firm X for a 
total of 20,000 shares.  ADP will then send out proxy materials accord-
ing to the brokers’ customer lists, with the result that it will send out 
proxy cards for more shares than are, in fact, entitled to vote.  In this 
example, although Merrill and Goldman collectively hold only 50,000 
shares, their customers will receive proxy cards representing 55,000 
shares.  Because the shorted shares are often not attributed to specific 
customer accounts, it is unclear which customers are entitled to vote.  
If fewer than 15,000 Merrill shares are voted, this problem is shoved 
under the table by pretending that the Merrill customers who re-
turned proxies were all entitled to vote and some of those who did not 
return proxies were not entitled to vote anyhow.  But if proxies for 
more shares are returned than are entitled to vote—because the level 
of short-selling was high and the abstention rate was low—it is unclear 
what should be done. 
There are several possible effects of this system for collecting 
votes.  First, it may mean that some people who are shareholders are 
unable to vote their shares.  Second, it may mean that others who may 
not, in fact, own any shares (because they have been lent out) will 
nonetheless be able to vote.  Finally, it may result in a situation in 
which there is no answer to the question of who is entitled to vote. 
The MONY/AXA deal, discussed above, is an example of a con-
tested transaction that illustrates these problems.  The controversial 
buyout was approved by a margin of 1.7 million votes out of a total of 
50.1 million shares at a time when somewhere around 6.2 million 
shares had been shorted.259
258 Here we follow the excellent discussion of the complications attendant to short 
sales in Apfel et al.  Id. 
259 Bob Drummond, Corporate Voting Charade, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Apr. 2006, at 
96, 96 (using the MONY/AXA deal as an example of a short sale’s effects on corporate 
democracy). 
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Though the overvoting problem has been noted for a long time,260  
it is becoming more acute now because hedge fund activism makes 
close votes more likely and hedge funds engage in short selling at the 
time of votes.  We discuss this problem in greater detail, and examine 
possible solutions, in a separate paper.261 
C.  The Absence (So Far) of a Third Conflict:   
Paying Hedge Funds Off 
It is worth noting that we have not found any evidence for the ex-
istence of a third potential conflict between hedge funds and other 
investors:  hedge funds and managers making a side deal, such as 
greenmail, in which the firm pays the hedge fund to go away.  We are 
not aware of a single instance of hedge funds receiving greenmail, one 
of the 1980s’ classic examples of “dark side” behavior.  The absence of 
greenmail is interesting in its own right.  One possible explanation is 
that greenmail got such a bad name during the 1980s that hedge 
funds are too embarrassed to touch it, or, perhaps more plausibly, 
that boards are too embarrassed to offer it.  Alternatively, the absence 
of greenmail or similar devices may reflect the fact that there are so 
many hedge funds around that greenmail or similar devices will not 
provide firms with any protection and may well elicit even greater in-
terest.  Finally, it could be that accepting greenmail may not serve the 
long-term interests of activist hedge funds because it would under-
mine their credibility and their ability to obtain the support of other 
investors (which they may need to succeed in their activism) the next 
time around. 
260 A 1991 House Report recommended that the SEC promulgate a rule to handle 
this situation, and, specifically, a rule that would prohibit brokers and dealers 
from soliciting proxy voting instructions from or giving proxies at the direc-
tion of beneficial owners for more shares than the net amount owned benefi-
cially by each beneficial owner, as shown on the books and records of the bro-
ker or dealer, after subtracting the short security positions of each beneficial 
owner. 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-414, pt. 1, at 33 (1991).  More recently, the New York Stock Ex-
change has also identified this as a problem and is working on a solution.  See Informa-
tion Memorandum from the N.Y. Stock Exch. 1 (Nov. 5, 2004) (on file with authors) 
(“Several recent special examinations of member organizations’ proxy departments 
have discovered significant areas of concern involving an apparent systemic over-voting 
of proxies and a general lack of effective supervision.” (footnote omitted)). 
261 Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting (Mar. 
6, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
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IV.  PERVASIVE SHORT-TERMISM? 
Although many of the “dark side” problems identified in Part III 
have generated comment and controversy, the sharpest and most 
comprehensive criticism of hedge fund activism is that it exacerbates 
an already serious problem of “short-termism” in the executive suite.  
In this Part, we take that criticism seriously. 
A.  A Real Problem? 
Hedge funds come close to being the archetypal short-term inves-
tor.262  For some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a 
“long-term” investment.  Short-termism may thus pervade much that 
hedge funds do, including their corporate governance and control ac-
tivism.  Leading opponents of hedge fund activism, such as Martin 
Lipton, argue that hedge fund short-termism could cause managers 
not to make crucial long-term investments.263  And the German fi-
nance ministry set up a panel to assess the impact of, and consider 
regulation of, “short term profit-oriented foreign investors.”264  One’s 
views about whether hedge fund activism, on the whole, is desirable or 
undesirable are likely to turn on one’s stand on the short-termism 
problem.265
262 See Rita Raagas De Ramos, Concerns over Hedge Funds Rise as Market Volatility Rises 
Globally, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2006, at C5 (noting that hedge funds make up 40% to 
50% of average daily trading volume in major financial markets). 
263 See Battling for Corporate America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 69, 69 (“Martin 
Lipton, a veteran Wall Street lawyer, [complained] that ‘we have gone from the impe-
rial CEO to the imperial stockholder.’”); Attacks by Activist Hedge Funds, supra note 
20 (outlining a “checklist” for rebuffing hedge fund attacks).  Even if they are short-
term oriented, hedge funds’ short-term strategies may perform valuable functions.  For 
example, when hedge funds play their traditional role of arbitraging market ineffi-
ciencies, their pursuit of short-term profit will be one of the mechanisms that helps to 
bring the market price into alignment with the value of the firm.  Thus, for example, 
when prices are too high because of excessive optimism, hedge funds can be expected 
to short the stock, thereby putting some necessary downward pressure on the price.  
Moreover, even if the interests of short-term and long-term investors may occasionally 
conflict, their interests will often coincide.  To that extent, hedge funds, by furthering 
their own short-term interests, will also benefit long-term shareholders. 
264 Taylor & MacDonald, supra note 23, at C5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
265 There is so far limited empirical evidence regarding the effect of activism on 
company value.  See April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Hedge Fund Activism 35-36 (European 
Corp. Governance Inst. Fin. Working Paper No. 140/2006, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=913362 (finding that a company’s stock price increases 
when an activist hedge fund files a schedule 13D, but that accounting performance 
declines in the year following filing); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance 21-24 (Sept. 22, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) 
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Looking at the specific activities of hedge funds, there is often an 
inherent ambiguity as to whether they sacrifice valuable long-term 
projects in favor of short term gains.  Consider Deutsche Börse’s (DB) 
failed attempt to acquire the London Stock Exchange (LSE), dis-
cussed earlier.266  DB’s CEO wanted to acquire the LSE and convinced 
the board that doing so was a good idea.  Hedge funds that had ac-
quired large stakes in DB disagreed.  They maintained that the plan to 
acquire the LSE represented wasteful managerial empire building and 
that DB’s cash reserves should instead be distributed to shareholders.  
Now, if the investment in acquiring the LSE was a valuable long-term 
project, then the involvement of the hedge funds would have had the 
effect of pushing the company toward the lower value outcome:  an 
outcome worse for long-term shareholders than acquiring the LSE.  If 
the hedge funds were right that the investment was simply a bad in-
vestment driven by delusions of grandeur, their opposition benefited 
both short-term and long-term shareholders.267
For the short-term trading horizon of hedge funds to generate a 
short-term investment outlook for hedge fund managers, the stock 
market must suffer from myopia:  that is, it must undervalue long-term 
investments relative to short-term investments.  If the market does not 
itself suffer from such a bias, then the interests of investors with short-
term trading horizons will not conflict with those of investors with 
long-term trading horizons.  In the case of the DB’s attempt to acquire 
LSE, for example, a conflict between hedge funds with short-term 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2006/oct/hedge_fund.pdf (find-
ing abnormal stock price increases upon announcement of activism and no support 
for the assertion that activism destroys value or is short-term focused).  Since hedge 
fund activism is a relatively recent phenomenon, these studies, by necessity, cannot 
measure the long-term effect of such activism. 
266 See supra Part I.A.2.a. 
267 This analysis nicely illustrates the different ways in which hedge fund involve-
ment, when it crosses a critical threshold, can affect shareholders.  Were hedge funds 
only to hold a small percentage of either DB or the LSE, and were the market to over-
value the transaction’s worth to the companies, they could bet against the DB bid for 
the LSE by shorting DB stock.  If they could be short for a long enough time, they 
would make money if it turned out that they were right that this was empire building 
and would lose money if it turned out that this was value enhancing.  While, in the DB 
case, the hedge funds were likely right, there are other cases in which they bet against 
a complex strategy and lost.  The clearest case seems to be the investment strategies 
surrounding the transaction between Lampert, Kmart, and Sears.  When Lampert ac-
quired control of Kmart, the stock was heavily shorted.  Byron, supra note 109.  But 
within a year, the stock had gone from $15 per share to $109 per share.  Supra text ac-
companying notes 110-114.  Had those with the short view held a controlling position, 
they may have blocked the strategy, to shareholders’ detriment. 
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trading horizons and other investors with long-term horizons would 
exist only if the market myopically failed to incorporate the long-term 
benefits of acquiring LSE into the stock price of DB. 
Whether and under what circumstances the market suffers from 
myopia has been the subject of substantial analysis and debate.  Many 
managers, directors, private equity funds, investment bankers, and 
others involved in the management and sale of companies are con-
vinced that the market is myopic.  Others believe that the allegations 
of myopia are a foil for managerial failure to deliver results.268  Aca-
demics have developed theoretical models showing that market myo-
pia can result in a number of circumstances.269  Much of the current 
research in finance starts from the assumption that capital markets 
are not perfectly efficient.270  But the empirical evidence on the extent 
and magnitude of myopia is sketchy at best.271
268 E.g., Barry Rosenstein, Activism Is Good for All Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
2006, at 17; see also Ubben & Haarmeyer, supra note 160, at 60 (arguing that it is im-
portant to distinguish between activists that are “short-term saber rattlers” and those 
that are “long-term value creators” and criticizing defenders of entrenched manage-
ment for trying to tar all activists with the same brush). 
269 See generally Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Why Defer to Managers?  
A Strong-Form Efficiency Model (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper 
No. 05-19, 2005); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of In-
vestors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148 (1990); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Mar-
kets, Inefficient Firms:  A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655 (1989); 
Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988).  
Although the common view is that market myopia leads to underinvestment in long-
term opportunities, some have argued that it can lead to overinvestment as well.  E.g., 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overin-
vestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719 (1993). 
270 For a short survey of the prevailing theories on market efficiency, see Michael 
L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 787, 801-04 (2003). 
271 Some of the studies focus on the effect on managerial myopia of institutional 
investors, which has been argued to have a shorter-term trading horizon than other 
investors.  See, e.g., Mary M. Bange & Werner F.M. De Bondt, R&D Budgets and Corporate 
Earnings Targets, 4 J. CORP. FIN. 153, 156 (1998) (finding that managers are less likely 
to manipulate R&D budgets to reduce discrepancies between analysts’ forecasts and 
reported income when institutional investors own a higher stake); Brian J. Bushee, The 
Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 
306-07 (1998) (arguing that institutions generally reduce myopic pressure, but that 
institutions with high turnover that engage in momentum trading encourage myopia); 
Sumit K. Majumdar & Anuradha Nagarajan, The Impact of Changing Stock Ownership Pat-
terns in the United States:  Theoretical Implications and Some Evidence, 82 REVUE 
D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE [INDUS. ECON. REV.] 39, 50 (1997) (Fr.) (concluding that 
institutional investors have a positive and significant effect on R&D spending); Sunil 
Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial Myopia?, 6 J. 
CORP. FIN. 307, 311 (2000) (concluding that presence of institutional investors, regard-
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Arguably, the phenomenal growth of private equity funds—whose 
basic business model includes taking companies private so that they 
can be reconfigured away from the short-term pressures on public 
companies—indicates that there may well be a serious problem of 
myopia.  KKR, Blackstone, Carlyle, Apollo, and TPG all have raised, or 
are currently raising, new funds in excess of $10 billion.272  Then 
again, the business model of private equity funds also includes provid-
ing high-powered incentives to managers and monitoring them 
less of investment style, leads to more investment in long-term projects); Sumit K. Ma-
jumdar & Anuradha Nagarajan, The Long-Term Orientation of Institutional Investors:  An 
Empirical Investigation 19 (Univ. of Mich. Sch. of Bus. Admin., Working Paper No. 9504-
13, 1994), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/35883 (finding 
that institutions prefer to invest in firms with long-term orientation).  Other studies 
focus on the effect of threatened hostile takeovers—which Lipton and others have 
suggested generates undesirable short-termism—on R&D expenses and similar meas-
ures of long-term investments.  While one study suggests that, consistent with the short-
termism hypothesis, R&D expenses might increase after the enactment of antitakeover 
legislation, two other studies found that R&D declines after the adoption of antitake-
over provisions.  See Mark S. Johnson & Ramesh P. Rao, The Impact of Antitakeover 
Amendments on Corporate Financial Performance, 32 FIN. REV. 659, 674 tbl.2 (1997) (find-
ing that R&D expenses decline after the adoption of an antitakeover provision); Lisa 
K. Muelbroek et al., Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia:  An Empirical Test, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1108, 1114-15 (1990) (same).  But see William N. Pugh & John S. Jahera, Jr., 
State Antitakeover Legislation and Shareholder Wealth, 13 J. FIN. RES. 221, 221, 226 tbl.1 
(1990) (finding a marginal increase in returns following enactment of an antitakeover 
statute, which the authors link to long-term investment, such as R&D).  Other studies 
look at other aspects of myopia.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Abarbanell & Victor Bernard, Is the 
U.S. Stock Market Myopic? 38 J. ACCT. RES. 221, 221-22 (2000) (concluding that “stock 
prices do not generally exhibit myopic behavior”); Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, The 
Post-merger Performance Puzzle, in 1 ADVANCES IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 7, 37 (Cary 
Cooper & Alan Gregory eds., 2000)  (rejecting EPS myopia as an explanation for nega-
tive long-run stock returns after mergers); Federico Ballardini et al., Do Stock Markets 
Value Innovation?  A Meta-Analysis 27 (2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=717562 (finding that the market values $1 invested in R&D 
as much or more than $1 invested in tangible assets); Mei Cheng et al., Earnings Guid-
ance and Managerial Myopia 2-3 (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=851545 (finding that firms dedicated to giving quarterly 
earnings guidance engage in more myopic R&D investments); Craig W. Holden & 
Leonard L. Lundstrum, Costly Trade, Managerial Myopia, and Long-Term Investment 
2-3 (March 28, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=809507 (finding that the introduction of long-term options (LEAPS) is asso-
ciated with an increase in long-term investments). 
272 Peter Smith, Texas Pacific Raises Record $14bn for New Fund, FT.COM, Apr. 2, 2006 
(noting that TPG has raised more than $14 billion for its latest fund, while Blackstone 
raised at least $13.5 billion, and Apollo Management and KKR each raised over $10 
billion).  More than $250 billion is estimated to have been raised by private equity 
funds in 2005.  Id. 
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closely.273  Whether private equity and activist hedge funds pursue 
complementary strategies for maximizing firm value (with both target-
ing managerial agency costs in a different fashion), whether they are 
competitors in the same markets (as private equity funds open hedge 
funds and hedge funds take companies private), or whether hedge 
funds aggravate market imperfections and thus drive firms into the 
arms of private equity remains unclear. 
Short-termism thus presents the potentially most important, most 
controversial, most ambiguous, and most complex problem associated 
with hedge fund activism.  The other dark side problems represent 
relatively isolated and narrow concerns that do not relate to hedge 
fund activism as a whole.  Short-termism, by contrast, arguably per-
vades hedge fund activism, and the accusation that hedge funds in-
duce managerial short-termism has become the main ammunition for 
hedge fund critics.  At the same time, among the problems associated 
with hedge fund activism, the very existence of a short-termism prob-
lem is the least proven, its manifestations—if it does exist—are the 
most manifold, and potential solutions are the least evident. 
B.  Potential Responses? 
Let us assume that hedge fund managers tend to prefer that com-
panies engage in projects with short-term payoffs, even if there are 
projects with longer-term payoffs that are more valuable.  Should the 
law intervene, and if so, how? 
The answer to these questions depends on a number of factors.  
First, even if hedge funds have short-term biases, to what extent is 
hedge fund activism driven by excessive short-termism?  Activist hedge 
funds are agents of change with specific goals that depend on the par-
ticular company.  When the company is diversified, hedge funds often 
push for divestitures.  When it is underperforming, they often push 
for the sale of the company or a change in management.  When the 
company has excess cash on hand, they push for stock repurchases or 
dividends.  When the company has assets on its balance sheet that can 
be monetized (e.g., real estate), they push to monetize those assets.  
When companies are pursuing capital-intensive investment plans, 
hedge funds sometimes oppose the plans and push for the cash to be 
returned to shareholders.  In the control area, hedge funds sometimes 
273 Private Equity’s Successes Stir Up a Backlash That May Be Misdirected, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 31, 2007, at A9 (suggesting that improved incentives and reduced pressure to 
achieve quarterly earnings allow private equity firms to enhance value). 
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make bids, sometimes advocate or oppose deals from either side of 
the transaction, and often try to get better terms for the target.  Is it 
always the case that, when a hedge fund gets involved, it is pushing for 
business strategies with a short-term payoff over strategies with a more 
valuable long-term payoff?  Or is the short-term payoff preferred by 
hedge funds sometimes the more valuable one?  And how often is 
hedge fund activism motivated by altogether different concerns, such 
as bad management, an ill-advised strategy, or an insufficient price in 
an acquisition?274  Is the controversy really about different investment 
horizons, or does it instead reflect a substantive dispute over the ap-
propriate course of action for the firm? 
Second, how long is the horizon of managers? 275  A plausible ar-
gument can be made that it is managers, not just markets, that suffer 
from myopia these days.  Many CEOs are close to retirement age and, 
even among younger CEOs, turnover is high.  Executives’ stock op-
tions continually vest and are exercised or hedged, if only to diversify 
their portfolio.  Bonuses are often based on short-term performance 
goals.  Is it sometimes management’s failure to invest in valuable long-
term projects that creates the opening for hedge fund activism? 
Third, when and to what extent do hedge funds succeed in affect-
ing corporate policy?  Though hedge funds have become highly active 
in the corporate governance area, they generally have not become 
powerful enough to exercise control over the targets of their activ-
ism.276  Rather, they purchase a sizeable, but far from controlling 
stake—rarely more than 5% to 10%—and then seek to influence cor-
porate strategies.277  Even when hedge funds commence a proxy con-
test, they usually seek only minority representation on the board.  Ac-
274 See, e.g., Janet Adamy, Investor Peltz Urges Heinz To Shed More Lines, Pare Payments, 
WALL ST. J., May 24, 2006, at C4 (reporting that a hedge fund asked Heinz to, among 
other things, sell its line of Italian baby food and use new forms of marketing to in-
crease ketchup consumption). 
275 See, e.g, Jason Singer, Carlyle Will Join Financiers’ Moves into Hedge Funds, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 1, 2006, at C1 (reporting a trend among private equity funds to enter the 
faster-paced business of hedge funds). 
276 See Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context, supra note 132, at 1 (“In larger 
transactions [the success of hedge funds in blocking a deal] will often require that the 
activists’ position be supported by more traditional institutional investors and ISS.”) 
277 See supra Part I.A (describing the tactics of corporate governance activism); see 
also Plitch, supra note 253, at 4 (noting that hedge funds “typically acquire a stake of 
less than 10%”).  Even when several hedge funds become active in a specific portfolio 
company, they generally do not control it.  See, e.g., Armitstead, supra note 68 (describ-
ing the ownership of the institutions that eventually blocked the purchase of the Lon-
don Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse). 
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tivist hedge funds often have a chair at the metaphorical table where 
corporate strategy is set, giving them an opportunity to present their 
views.  In order to see their views prevail, however, hedge funds usu-
ally need the support of others278—which cannot be taken for 
granted.279  These “others” include, in particular, corporate manage-
ment, independent directors, traditional institutional investors with 
large stakes, and other large shareholders.  To the extent that the larg-
est shareholders are effectively indexers, a strategy that results in a 
short-term increase in share price (which benefits hedge funds), but a 
long-term loss (that hurts long-term shareholders), will not be attrac-
tive.  More generally, over time, the degree of support that hedge 
funds receive will likely depend on whether long-term shareholders 
benefit. 
Fourth, if the determination of corporate policy, once hedge 
funds are involved, depends on multiple constituents, how do these 
constituents interact?  At present, it seems that hedge funds often act 
as a counterweight to the substantial power of management, with the 
consequence that the effective power partly shifts to other groups, 
such as independent directors and traditional institutional investors.  
Independent directors and large shareholders, of course, may some-
times make mistakes, but management is not infallible either.  We are 
inclined to be optimistic about the resulting interaction, which often 
results in a compromise rather than an outright victory for either 
hedge funds or management.280  But another possibility—though one 
that we have so far not witnessed—is that hedge funds will enter an 
unholy alliance, either by being bought off by management through 
the payment of greenmail or its functional equivalent, or by teaming 
up with other large shareholders to advance their respective parochial 
interests to the detriment of shareholders at large. 
Given these questions, a sufficient case for legal intervention has 
not been made.  Our conclusion partly results from the uncertainties:  
about whether short-termism is a real problem, about the nature of 
the problem, about how much it affects hedge fund activism, and 
278 See Rosenstein, supra note 268 (characterizing hedge fund activism as “cam-
paigns between [hedge funds and managers] for the support of the company’s true 
owners, its shareholders”). 
279 See Client Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Financial Insti-
tutions Developments 4 (Feb. 22, 2006) (noting success by some firms in persuading 
large institutional shareholders to support their boards). 
280 Hovanesian & Byrnes, supra note 221, at 2 (noting that there is “scope for the 
warring parties to find a mutually beneficial resolution”). 
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about how hedge fund activism relates to potential managerial short-
termism.  This conclusion also partly results from our observations 
that, at present, hedge funds influence, but do not control, corporate 
policy, that they depend on the support of other shareholders, and 
that they have shied away from greenmail and other similar unsavory 
tactics. 
But our conclusion also rests, to a large extent, on our view, which 
we have developed elsewhere, that companies (and the market more 
generally) will adopt what we have called “adaptive devices” to deal 
with the potential negative effects of hedge fund short-termism.281  To 
see the shape of some of these devices, one need look no further than 
the “Hedge Fund Attack Response Checklist” mailed by Martin Lipton 
to the clients of his firm.  In this widely circulated memo, Lipton rec-
ommends that companies prepare in advance for hedge fund activism 
by:  periodically updating the board of directors, reviewing dividend 
policy, improving financial public relations, maintaining consistency 
in the company’s strategic message, proactively addressing reasons for 
any shortfall in peer company benchmarks, maintaining regular and 
close contact with major institutional investors, and reviewing basic 
strategy with the board.282  These are terrific ideas, not just to deal 
with activist hedge funds, but in general.  If companies follow Lipton’s 
advice, hedge funds will already have made significant positive contri-
butions to the management of U.S. companies.  Moreover, if hedge 
funds can succeed, despite companies taking these measures, we think 
that chances are reasonably high that they have identified a real prob-
lem. 
One adaptive device missing from Lipton’s list, but one that mer-
its particular attention, is private equity.  Vast sums are now available 
to take companies private, sums largely provided by the same (alleg-
edly myopic) institutional investors who hold the shares of public 
281 See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned To Stop Worrying 
and Love the Pill:  Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872 (2002). 
282 Attacks by Activist Hedge Funds, supra note 20; see also Shareholder Activism in 
the M&A Context, supra note 132 (recommending that companies “be proactive in ex-
plaining the reasons for, and the benefits of, a transaction,” ensure that the board’s posi-
tion is accurately understood, and engage in early and open communication with signifi-
cant stockholders); Hedge Fund and Institutional Shareholder Activism, SEC UPDATE (Mayer 
Brown Rowe & Maw, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 21, 2006, at 1, 7, available at 
http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/ 
publications/article.asp?id=2703&nid=6 (recommending that companies review their 
dividend policies, proactively address reasons for any shortfall in performance, and 
maintain close contact with major investors). 
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companies and invest in hedge funds.  As we have noted above, pri-
vate equity can be an escape mechanism for companies that suffer 
from excessive short-term pressures in the public market.283  If it is in-
deed hedge funds that contribute substantially to such short-term 
pressures, it is no small irony that hedge funds and traditional private 
equity funds are now converging.284  In an increasing number of high-
profile deals, hedge funds have taken on “the type of long-term con-
trol investing previously the domain of private equity funds.”285  If 
hedge funds are part of the problem because their activism exacer-
bates short-termism, they may also be part of the solution as they de-
velop private equity expertise.  This, by itself, shows how multifaceted 
hedge funds are as an investment vehicle, and should caution against 
adopting hasty regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
We are observing an evolutionary process in real time.  Hedge 
funds—highly incentivized, mostly unconflicted, and largely unen-
cumbered by regulatory constraints—have become the prime corpo-
rate governance and control activists.  They pursue activism as a 
profit-making strategy and make investments in order to become ac-
tivist, rather than as an afterthought to a failed portfolio investment.  
Thus, they blur the line between risk arbitrage and governance and 
control battles.  The emergence of hedge funds and the role they play 
prove that there is money to be made from being an active share-
holder. 
One of the most intriguing developments we are starting to ob-
serve is the division of labor between hedge funds and more tradi-
tional institutional investors.  Because hedge funds are typically rela-
tively undiversified, they show little interest in agitating for systemic 
changes, such as anti-poison pill or staggered board campaigns.  On 
the other hand, hedge funds engage in firm-specific agitation to a de-
gree unheard of among traditional institutional investors, with tradi-
283 See Hedge Fund and Institutional Investor Activism, supra note 282, at 1 (noting 
that private equity funds are looking to take private targets of shareholder activism). 
284 See Singer, supra note 275 (noting that an increasing number of private equity 
firms are opening hedge funds); cf. Groups’ Report Recommends Moving Away from Short-
Term Corporate Thinking, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1315 (2006) (referencing a report by 
CFA Centre that accuses corporate managers of a “short-term obsession”). 
285 Woodrow W. Campbell & Jennifer A. Spiegel, Hybrid Vehicles, THEDEAL.COM, June 
17, 2005, available at http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/ 
TDDArticle/TDStandardArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=1118184148575. 
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tional institutions sometimes tagging along.  As a representative of 
one traditional institution said, in connection with the battle to stop 
Deutsche Börse’s attempt to acquire the London Stock Exchange, 
“The hedge funds have done a marvelous job.  No matter how we feel 
about companies, traditional managers simply cannot move as fast to 
achieve our aims.  We were right behind [the hedge funds], but we 
couldn’t have done it without them.”286
But there is also a potential downside to activism.  The interests of 
hedge funds sometimes diverge from those of their fellow sharehold-
ers, and activism creates stress fractures for the regulatory system.  The 
most serious accusation leveled against activist funds, however, is that 
activism is designed to achieve a short-term payoff at the expense of 
long-term profitability.  It is here that the challenge lies for boards, 
traditional institutional investors, and the market as a whole.  If the 
proposals made by hedge funds are sometimes valuable and some-
times misguided, how good are we at figuring out which is which?  
While we do not pretend to know the answer to this question, we be-
lieve that market forces and adaptive devices adopted by companies 
individually in response to activism are better designed to help sepa-
rate good ideas from bad ones than is additional regulation. 
Hedge funds are here to stay.  They are prominent in control 
transactions and elsewhere.  Their influence is being felt, but their fu-
ture is uncertain.  As hedge funds grow, will they retain their separate 
identity (and get stronger) or will (some of them) morph into high-
fee mutual funds?  Will activist investment opportunities for hedge 
funds dry up as more money chases these opportunities, or will more 
hedge funds become activist in response to the profits to be earned?  
If smart hedge fund investors keep hedge fund managers honest, will 
an expansion of the investor base reduce the monitoring of hedge 
fund managers and make them worse agents for their investors? 
Finally, one can predict a backlash, although the exact form it 
takes will depend on the nature of the scandal that leads to the regu-
latory intervention.  We are already beginning to see a regulatory re-
action at the SEC, with a (failed) attempt to adopt rules requiring the 
regulation of hedge fund advisers,287 and preparation for such regula-
tion in Europe.  When the inevitable crisis occurs, there will be pres-
286 See Armitstead, supra note 73. 
287 See generally Hedge Funds and the SEC, supra note 197, at 68 (reporting the federal 
appeals court decision striking down “an attempt by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to monitor the industry”). 
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sure to regulate further.  At this point, the most important admoni-
tion—obvious in a period of calm but less so after an explosion—is to 
regulate cautiously and carefully. 
 
